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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,

Supreme Court Case No. 38759

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the Distriet Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

KA THR YN A. STICKLEN
HONORABLE KATHRYN

SCOTT MCKAY

JOHN C. KEENAN

A TTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
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Date: 7/26/2011

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 04: 19 PM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 2

User: CCTHIEBJ

Case: CV-OC-2010-17486 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen
Stick len
Two Jinn Inc vs. Idaho Department Of Insurance

Two Jinn Inc vs. Idaho Department Of Insurance
Date

Code

User

9/3/2010

NCOC

CCRANDJD

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Kathryn A. SticklEm

PETN

CCRANDJD

Petition for Judicial Review

Kathryn A. SticklEm

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion to Stay Final Agency Order

Kathryn A. SticklEm

AFSM

CCRANDJD

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Kathryn A. SticklEm

MEMO

CCRAND.ID

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOHG

CCCHILER

Notice Of Hearing

Kathryn A. SticklEm

HRSC

CCCHILER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10104/201003:00
10/04/201003:00
PM) to stay final agency action

Stick len
Kathryn A. Sticklen

9/16/2010

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay
Final Agency Order

Kathryn A. SticklEm

9/20/2010

OGAP

DCTYLENI

Order Governing Judicial Review

Kathryn A. Sticklen

9/24/2010

NOTC

CCGARDAIL

Amended Notice of Lodging Agency Record and
Transcripts

Kathryn A.

NOTC

CCSWEECE

Petitioner's Notice Of Non-Objection To Agency
Record

Kathryn A. Sticklm

9/29/2010

MISC

CCHOLMEI=

Certificate of Agency Record

Kathryn A. SticklE!n

9/30/2010

MEMO

CCHOLMEI::
CCHOLMEI=

Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioners
Motion to Stay

Kathryn A. SticklE!n

10/4/2010

HRHD

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion held on 10/04/2010
03:00 PM: Hearing Held to stay final agency
action

Kathryn A. SticklE!n

ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final
Agency Order

Kathryn A. Stickle!n

11/1/2010

STIP

CCNELSRF

Stipulation to Extend Time to File Petitioner's
Brief

Kathryn A. Stickle!n

11/4/2010

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Stickle,n
Order Approving Stipulation to Extend Time to
Kathryn A. Stick/e'n
File Petitioner's Brief (Opening Brief due 12/2/10)

12/2/2010

BREF

CCDWONCP

Petitioner's Opening Brief

Kathryn A. Stickle,n

12/30/2010

BREF

CCBOYIDR

Respondent's Brief

Kathryn A. Stickle,n
Stickle'n

1/20/2011

BREF

CCWRIGRM

Petitioners Reply Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

1/27/2011

NOTC

CCHOLMEE

Notice of Oral Argument

Kathryn A. Sticklen

2/15/2011

HRSC

DCDANSEl.

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
02/16/2011 03:00 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

2/16/2011

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Kathryn A. Stickle n
on 02/16/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: NONE
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

5/3/2011

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Petition
Seeking Judicial Review

CDIS

DCTYLENI

Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Department Of Kathryn A. Sticklen
Insurance, Defendant; Two Jinn Inc, Plaintiff.
Filing date: 5/3/2011

9/13/2010

Judge

SticklE~n
SticklE~n

Kathryn A. Stickle n
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vs. Idaho Department Of Insurance

Two Jinn Inc VS.
vs. Idaho Department Of Insurance
Date

Code

User

5/3/2011

STAT

DCTYLENI

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Kathryn A. SticklE!n

CCLUNDM.J

Notice of Appeal

Kathryn A. SticklE!n

6/7/2011

Judge

6/14/2011

MISC

CCHEATJL

Estimated Cost Of Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A. SticklE!n

6/27/2011

NOTC

CCMASTLW

Notice of Payment of Estimated Cost of Appeal
Transcript

Kathryn A. SticklE!n
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Scott McKay (ISB#4309)
Robyn Fyffe (ISB#7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise,ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274
smckay@nbmlaw.com
rfyffe@nbmlaw.com

NO.
~
A.M
__
A.M _ _ _ _-_--~_-rc~~3:'

--_·~_-,
P,M"-.::::L=:-===

SEP 03 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner Two Jinn,
linn, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of:
TWO JINN, INC.'s
Request for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

)
)
)
)
)

.
---- )
-_
-)
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation )
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and )
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and )
Anytime Bail Bonds;
)

Petitioner,

,.v

O-Ccase~V
0&
Case~

lOli'486'

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Cat: 1(3)
Fee: $88.00

)
)
)

vs.

)
)
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE)
)
)
Respondent.
)

1. Petitioner, Two Jinn Inc., which does business in Idaho as Aladdin and Anytime B :iiI
lil
Bonds (hereinafter "Two Jinn" or "Aladdin"), hereby petitions the Fourth Judicial District of the
State ofIdaho, Ada County, for judicial review of a final agency action ofthe Idaho Department

1 • PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

OR\G\~JAL
OR\G\~JAL
000004

of Insurance (hereinafter "DOl"). This petition is filed pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 67-5232
and 5270 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and seeks review of the DOl Director's Findings,
tt e
Conclusions and Final Order (Final Order), which the Director filed on August 20, 2010 in tr
matter styled: In the Matter o/Two Jinn, Inc. 's Request/or Declaratory Ruling Regarding Id1ho

Code § 41-1042, DOl Docket No. 18-2579-09. This Order determined Two Jinn's Request f,)[
Declaratory Ruling Regarding I.C. § 41-1042, which Two Jinn filed with the Director pursualt to

I.e. § 67-5232(1) on December 10,2009.
2. The Final Order was entered following oral argument before the Director on July 21,
2010. Oral argument was previously presented to hearing officer Jean Uranga on March 8, 2010.
Both arguments were taken before Monica M. Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public, M&M Court Reporting, Inc., P.O. Box 2636, Boise, 10 83701. Transcripts

o:~

both of these proceedings have already been prepared and paid for by Two Jinn.
3. Two Jinn provisionally states the issue for judicial review as follows:
Whether the DOl erred and acted in violation of statutory provisions and in excess ofts
authority by declaring that I.C. § 41-1042, which limits the charges a bail agent may assess in
connection with a bail transaction, precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity agreement

at the time of a bail transaction which permits the collection of apprehension and recovery co:;ts
later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required in court.
4. Two Jinn requests that the previously prepared transcripts of oral argument before Ihe
DOl Director and hearing officer described in paragraph 2, above, be made part of the record
before the district court.

2 • PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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5. I hereby certif:y that:
(A) Service of the instant petition has been made upon the 001;
(B) It is unnecessary to prepare additional transcripts; and
(C) That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for

the preparation of the record.
DATED this

L

1',;;,1
rc,l

day of September, 2010.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

~~-~~-Scott McKay
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc.

z3

3 • PETITION FOR JUOIClAL REVIEW
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/,.,(

I CERTIFY that on September
document to be:

£, 2010,
..£,
20 I0,

I caused a true and correct copy of the fore~,oing

mailed
{" hand deliven::d
faxed
to
Office of the Director
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, 10
ID 83720-0043
Mr. John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

~~

Scott McKay

4 • PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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Scott McKay (ISB#4309)
Robyn Fyffe (lSB#7063)
(ISB#7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise,ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274
smckay@nbmlaw.com
rfyffe@nbmlaw.com

SEP 03 2010
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of:
TWO lINN, INC.'s
Request for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

)
)
)
)
)

CaseNo·IV

OC 1017486

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER

-----)
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds;
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE)
)

Respondent.

)

------)

Petitioner Two linn, Inc., moves this Court to stay enforcement of the Findings,
Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling, which the Director for the Idaho
Department ofInsurance filed on August 20, 2010 in the matter styled In the Matter o/Two
of Two Jinn,

I • PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER

000008
ORIG!~JAL
ORIG!~JAL

DeclaratOlY Ruling Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042, DOl Docket No.
Inc. 's Request/or Declarat01Y
No.1] 882579-09. This Motion is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(m) and I.C. § 67-5274 and is supported
by the contemporaneously filed affidavit of James Garske and memorandum of counsel.
"",(
"d
DATED this ~ day of September, 2010.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Scott McKay
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc.

2 • PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,,<71

I CERTIFY that on September ~, 2010,
20 10, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:
mailed
.{/hand
~ hand deli vered

faxed
to
Office of the Director
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043
Mr. John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

==;

-sc~-t ~~--------=----M-cKa-y
Scott McKay

3 • PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER
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Scott McKay (ISB# 4309)
Robyn Fyffe
(ISB# 7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274
smckay@nbmlaw.com
rfyffe@nbmlaw.com

J. DAVIt} NAVAfi1RO,
NAVA~RO, Clerk
By J. FlANOALl
D~PUTY
D~PUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of:
TWO lINN, IJ\Jc.'s
Request for Dec1aratot;y
Declaratory' Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

)
)
)
)
)

-----)

)
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation )
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and )
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and )
Anytime Bail Bonds;
)
)
)
Petitioner,

CaseNo.CV

OC 1017486

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONI:R'S
MOTION TO STAY FINAL
AGENCY ACTION

)

vs.

)
)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE)
)

Respondent.

)

-----~)

1·

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDA VIT OF JAMES GARSKE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
STAY FINAL AGENCY ACTION
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

lames Garske, being first duly swom, deposes and says that:
1. I am over the age of 18 years old and I make the following statements based on m:'
own personal knowledge.
2. Since 2003, I have been employed by Two .linn,
linn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as
(hereinafter "Two linn" or "Aladdin"). My present
Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinaftcr
title is Director of N011hwest Operations and I currently supervise operations throughout Idaho.
3. As Director of Northwest Operations, I am familiar with issues effecting the
the Statc
State of Idaho.
company's operations in thc
4. In 2004, represcntativcs
representatives of Aladdin and the Idaho Department of Insurance ("DOl")
discussed thc
the position of a 001 representative that Idaho Code Section 41-1042 precludcs
precludes

th(~

provision of an indcmnity
indemnity agreement utilized by Aladdin which permits reimbursement for
\vho has failed to appear in Court
expenses incuned in attempting to re-capture a defendant who
(,"apprehension costs"). Aladdin's counse I at the ti me noti fied the DO I via lettcr
letter dated
("apprehension
November 9.2004 of
or our position that Scction
Section 41-1042 docs not limit the remedies availablc
available
upon breach of the bail bond agreement and that Aladdin was entitled to continue collecting
knowledge, no response to this letter
reasonable apprehension costs. To my knowledge.
Icttcr was received from
the 001.
5. I am unaware of further substantive communication from the 001 on this matter LITlti I
surety. Danielson
on or about January 2009, when a 001 representative sent a letter to Aladdin's surety,
National Insurance Company, indicating that a paragraph of Aladdin's indemnity agreement
I·

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
STA Y FINAL AGENCY ACTION

000012

"appears to contain language that is not in compliance with Idaho Code 41-1042 ... specifically
the language conceming recovery charges." This letter requested amendment of the indemni y
agreement and prompted renewed good faith discussions between Aladdin and the 001 regarding
Section 41-1042's applicability to apprehension costs. Following Aladdin and the DOl's
continued disagreement, the parties discussed that Aladdin would seek a formal declaratory
ruling from the 001 on Section 41-1042's scope pursuant to

I.e.

~

67-5232(1) from which

Aladdin could thereafter seek judicial review if necessary.
6. Aladdin requested a declaratory ruling from the 001 on or about December 10, 2009
nO\\/ seeking judicial review of the DOl's
DO)"s ruling.
and is nm\/

This ends my Affidavit.

J

ri.?

------=::-day of September, 20 J 0.
DATED this ------==-day
O.

55r J day of SePli4idm,
.. JQ}0.
SePli4id~f'I,..JQ}0.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO be ore me this

hb1

,

.
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#
~~
~
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Notary Public for Idahi·.
My commission expire\:

,.

.

•
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~

2·
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\: ·0

~I
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AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION
A Y FINAL
FTNAL AGENCY ACTION
ST AY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1"<:/

I CERTIFY that on September ~, 2010, I caused a true and coneet copy of the
foregoing document to be:
mailed

L

hand delivered
faxed

to:
Office of the Director
Idaho DepaJ1ment of lnsurance
Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise. ID 83720-0043

Mr. John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 8:n~0
8:n~O
Boise. ID 83720-0043

~.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES GARSKE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
STA Y FINAL AGENCY ACTION
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Scott McKay (ISB#4309)
(lSB#4309)
Robyn Fyffe (ISB#7063)
(lSB#7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise,ID
Boise, 10 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274
smckay@nbmlaw.com
rfyffe@nbmlaw.com

J. DAVIO NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDALL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of:
TWO JINN, INC.'s
Request for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

)
)
)
)
)

._----)
)
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation )
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and )
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and )
Anytime Bail Bonds;
)

Petitioner,

CaseNo.CV
caseNo.CV

OC 1017486

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER

)
)
)

)
)
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE)
)
Respondent.
)

vs.

-----~)

1·

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL
AGENCY ORDER

ORIG\~~AL
ORIG\~~AL
000015

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2004, representatives of Two linn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as Aladdin and
Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Two linn" or "Aladdin") and the Idaho Department of
Insurance ("DOl") discussed the position of a DOl representative that Idaho Code Section 41
411042 precludes Aladdin from entering indemnity agreements during the bail transaction that
provide for reimbursement for expenses incurred in attempting to re-capture a defendant whc has
failed to appear in Court ("apprehension costs"). Affidavit of James Garske,

~

4. Aladdin

notified the DOl via letter dated November 9, 2004 of its position that Section 41-1042 does not
limit the remedies available upon breach of the bail bond agreement and that Aladdin was
entitled to continue collecting reasonable apprehension costs. Id. The DOl did not substanti'lely
respond to this letter. !d.
In January 2009, a DOl representative sent a letter to the surety insurance company
utilized by Aladdin, Danielson National Insurance Company, instructing it to amend the
Indemnity Agreement to diminate the provision regarding collection of apprehensions costs. Id.
at

~

5. This letter prompted a renewed good faith discussion between Aladdin and the DOl

regarding Section 41-1042' s applicability to apprehension costs. Id. Following the parties'

continued disagreement, they discussed that Aladdin would seek a declaratory ruling on Section
4l-1042's scope from which Aladdin would thereafter seek judicial review if necessary. Id.
41-1042's
On December 10, 2009, Aladdin petitioned the DOl for a declaratory ruling pursuant 10
I.C. § 67-5232(1) asking the DOl to declare that I.C. § 41-1042 does not preclude bail agents or
their surety from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction permitting

2·

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL
AGENCY ORDER
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the recovery of actual expenses later incurred in connection with the apprehension and surrerder
of a criminal defendant as a result of that criminal defendant's failure to appear in court as
required.
The DOl assigned the matter to a hearing officer. The parties submitted briefs and
stipulated to the relevant underlying facts and the hearing officer heard oral argument on March
8,2010. On April 1,2010, the hearing officer issued "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Preliminary Order" finding that I.C. § 41-1042 precludes agreements providing for
reimbursement for apprehension and surrender costs because those costs are not expressly
delineated as permitted charges for the bail agent's service in a bail transaction.
On April 14, 201
n, Aladdin filed a Petition for Review of Preliminary Order with the
2010,
Director of the DOl and the Director heard oral argument on July 21, 2010. On August 10, 2 J10,
the Director issued Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Rulinf;
("Final Order"), which ordered that bail agents and sureties are precluded by I.e. § 41-1042 from
entering into indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs
contemporaneously with the bail transaction. Aladdin has filed a Petition for Judicial Review
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(m) and I.e. § 67-5274 contemporaneously with the instant motion.

II. ARGUMENT
Upon appropriate terms, the reviewing court may stay the enforcement of the action of an
agency that is subject to a petition for judicial review. I.C. § 67-5274; I.R.C.P. 84(m); see

al~'o

statute'.
IDAPA 04.11.01.780 (final agency orders may be stayed by the judiciary according to statutel.
There do not appear to be: any Idaho cases addressing the standard for granting a stay pursuant to

3·

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL
AGENCY ORDER
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I.c. § 67-5274 and I.R.C.P. 84(m). However, in ruling on a motion for a stay pending appeal, the
Ninth Circuit considers: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a ,tay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Calzjornia
CalzJornia Pharmacists Ass'n v.
Maxwell-Jol~v,
Maxwell-Jol~v,

563 F
.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 2009). The required degree of irreparable harm
F.3d

decreases as the probabil:ity of success increases. Golden Gate Restaurant Ass 'n v. City and
County of
San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008).
ofSan

1.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Section 41-1042' s scope is an issue of first impression for Idaho courts and indeed, no
Idaho case even cites this statute. The DOl's interpretation of this statute, as set forth in the Final
Order, is contrary to the statute's plain language. Accordingly, Aladdin is likely to prevail or the
nove11egal
present(:d in the instant petition for review.
novel
legal issue present(!d
agel( s
At issue in this action is whether I.C. § 41-1042, which limits charges for the bail agel!'
service in the bail transaction, implicates the third paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement for
Surety Bail Bond (hereinafter "Indemnity Agreement" or "Paragraph Three"). Paragraph Three

obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to agree to pay
incuned at a later date in the event the criminal defendant breaches the
expenses that might be incurred
bail bond agreement by f:liling to appear in court as ordered and it becomes necessary to
apprehend and return the defendant to court.
Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1 042( 1), a bail agent must not charge or collect money or other

4·

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL
AGENCY ORDER
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valuable consideration from any person except to pay premiums, to provide collateral, and to
reimburse the bail agent for certain enumerated expenses incurred in connection with the bail
transaction and, according to

I.e. § 41-1042(2), a bail agent may not make any additional chcrges

"for his service in a bail transaction." Paragraph Three does not describe charges for the bail
agent's service in the bail transaction but, rather, describes the remedy available to Aladdin and
its surety following the bail transaction in the event ofa breach of the agreement. Specifically,
this remedy is only implicated in those situations where the principal breaches his obligatiom: by
failing to appear as required in court. Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not apply to an agreement to
pay the contingent recovery expenses set forth in Paragraph Three.
This conclusion is reinforced by the statute's express provision pennitting bail agents to
collect collateral to secure the bail bond, which necessarily contemplates that the parties may
enter contracts describing remedies in the event of a breach of the bail bond agreement. The
Final Order acknowledges that the collateral, which a bail agent is pennitted to collect under
Section 41-1 042( 11)(b),
)(b), is to secure the bail bond in the event of forfeiture. Thus, the Final

O~der

illogically interprets Section 41-1042 as pennitting bail agents to contract for payment of the
entire bail bond but as prohibiting agents from contracting for reimbursement for apprehensi(,n

expenses incurred in avoiding payment of the entire bail bond.
This interpretation is internally inconsistent as neither the promise to pay the bail bond in
41the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay investigative costs is enumerated in Section 41
1042 as an allowable charge. Instead, Section 41-1042 has no application to either remedy
because neither represents a charge for the bail agent's service during the bail transaction.

5·
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Accordingly, the DOl's interpretation is contrary to the statute's plain language and Aladdin s
likely to prevail on the merits of the instant petition for review.

2.

Respective Risk of Injury to the Parties
The scope ofIdaho Code § 41-1042 and its effect on bail agents' ability to contract for

the recovery of apprehension expenses at the time of the bail transaction has been the subject of
good-faith discussions between Aladdin and DOl representatives for several years. The
Indemnity Agreement at issue has been utilized by Aladdin during these discussions. Ifunable to
continue using this agreement, Aladdin will be forced to either cease apprehension efforts wrere
a defendant fails to appear in court and simply collect the forfeiture from the indemnitor or
defendant, or to absorb those costs itself. In contrast to this irreparable financial injury, neither
the DOl nor the public wJill suffer an injury from a stay on the terms suggested by Aladdin and by
maintaining the status quo pending resolution of the instant petition for review.
The DOl's apparent concern involves the risk that bail bond consumers will be subjected
to unfair practices and, specifically, the risk that a consumer could be held liable for
apprehension costs in addition to the face amount of the bond in the event the bond remains
forfeited notwithstanding Aladdin's investigative efforts. Initially, Aladdin is unaware of any

allegation that it has attempted to collect unreasonable apprehension fees. Indeed, Aladdin is
already of the view that apprehension costs must not be excessive in relation to the face amOllnt
of the bond. See, e.g. I.C. § 41-1043 (collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face
amount of the bond).
The DOl agrees that Aladdin can require an indemnitor to post collateral at the time of

6·
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the bail transaction to secure the entire amount of the bail bond. An additional promise - sec ured
or unsecured - to reimburse Aladdin for apprehension expenses incurred in returning an
absconder to court does not expose the defendant or his indemnitor to any additional risk of
injury, particularly where the total liability is limited by the face amount of the bond. Indeed,
such agreements protect the consumer (and as discussed below serve the public interest) by
providing Aladdin with an incentive to re-capture the defendant and obtain exoneration of thr~
bClild
bond, rather than simply letting the forfeiture stand and collecting the entire amount of the bCllld
dl~fendant. Further, an indemnitor is better served by funding the cos:s of
from the indemnitor or dl~fendant.

apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as opposed to paying the higher cost of a
forfeited bond.
The Final Order dliscusses two circumstances in which an indemnitor may prefer not 10
agree to reimburse apprehension costs notwithstanding these concerns: (l) the indemnitor
I)r
believes that he will have: a better chance of convincing the defendant to appear or surrender l)r
believl~s that searching for the defendant would be futile so wants to limit lis
(2) the indemnitor be1ievl~s

liability to the face amount of the bond. Of course, the second concern is entirely addressed by
Aladdin's agreement that the indemnitor's liability for both the forfeiture and apprehension O)sts

is limited to the face amount of the bond.
As to the first concern, as a matter of sound business practice, Aladdin always attemp's to
utilize the least intrusive investigative tactics to secure the surrender of the defendant, including
contacting the indemnitor and requesting his assistance in convincing the defendant to selfsurrender. Further, the unreasonable nature of any expenses would be a defense to collection

7·
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efforts. For instance, in Saladino v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), a
bail agent sought to recover, pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a $4,000 fee paid to a licer sed
investigator to apprehend and surrender the principal to custody. 39 A.D.2d at 765. The court
held that under the broad language of the indemnity agreement, the bail agent was entitled to
recover expenses incurred in recapturing and surrendering the principal, provided such exper.ses
are the fair and reasonable value of services rendered. !d. However, because the principal was
residing with his wife without any attempt at concealment and working at his regular
employment, a $4,000 investigator fee was unreasonable. Id. In remanding for a new trial to
determine the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered the court noted that there

wa~

no

apparent reason why a surety should not first mount a more modest, superficial investigation
such as would have been adequate to locate the principal herein.
Aladdin stands to suffer irreparable injury if the Final Order becomes effective pending
the instant petition for review. Conversely, neither the DOl nor the public will be harmed by
maintaining the status quo and entering a stay as requested by Aladdin.
3.

Public Interest
Prohibiting Aladdin from recovering expenses incurred in recapturing and surrenderir g a

defendant is contrary to public policy. The primary purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of
the accused. State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788,792 (Ct.
App. 2007). Bail agents have the authority, and in fact are encouraged, to arrest a defendant who
has missed a court appearance and return him to court. See I.C. § 19-2914 (at any time befon: the
exoneration of bail, the surety insurance company or its bail agent ... may empower any pefS)n

8·
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of suitable age and discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the state"); I.C. §
19-2922 ("court shall order the bail exonerated: if the "defendant has appeared before the court
within one hundred eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture"); I.C.R. 46(h) (permitting
court to set aside forfeiture if it appears that justice does not require its enforcement after
consideration of several factors including "the participation of the person posting bail in loca ting
and apprehending the defendant").
The purpose of bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate
131 ,
absconders and return them to the court. See County Bonding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 13]
133 (Fla. App. 1998) ("The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the surety
has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant] is

of Com 'rs
to create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives"); Board ofCom
of
Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. App. 2003) (liberal interpretation
ofBrevard
of forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides incentives to sureties "to pursue those who lee
the jurisdiction").
It is axiomatic that there are costs associated with locating and apprehending absconding
criminal defendants. Further, it is not disputed that Aladdin can seek reimbursement for the

amount of a bail bond forfeiture. However, if Aladdin could not recover investigation costs, ;Tet
could recover the amount of the forfeited bond, it would have no financial incentive to locate and
return a criminal defendant to court. Such a result would be contrary to the bail bond's purpo ~e
of ensuring the defendant's appearance in court.
Moreover, the criminal defendant and his indemnitor's obligation under Paragraph Three

9·
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provide an important incentive to the defendant to appear for court. If the criminal defendan
knows that neither he nor his indemnitors, often family or friends, will be financially responsible
in the event he absconds, he is more likely to skip bail. Similarly, if the indemnitors are
financially responsible if the defendant skips bails, they have a financial incentive to assist the
defendant in making it to court or to assist the bail agents in effectuating the defendant's
surrender should he fail to do

SO.l

Permitting Aladdin to continue entering indemnity agreements permitting the recover:r
recover:' of
apprehension expenses furthers many of the public policy considerations at issue. According; y,
the public interest lies in granting Aladdin the requested stay.
III. CONCLUSION
It is appropriate to maintain the status quo by staying the effectiveness of the Final Order

pending judicial review given the novelty of the issue presented, the parties' history of good-£lith
good-fiith
discussions, the plain language of the statute and the financial harm that Two Jinn will suffer ifit
is unable to recover apprehension costs that an absconding defendant and his indemnitor has
previously agreed to pay. A stay will also serve the public interest by providing bail agents anl
their surety with the financial incentive to locate and return absconding criminal defendants to
court. Accordingly, the Court should order that the effectiveness ofthe Final Order be stayed
pending judicial review and a conclusion of this action.

lIn argument before the Director, notwithstanding his disagreement over the interpretation
of the statute, counsel for DOl staff indicated that he agreed "wholeheartedly with" Aladdin's
public policy arguments in this regard and that Aladdin's interpretation of the statute furthers the
purpose of bail. Tr. (7-21-2010) p. 20, In. 10-15.
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DA
TED this
DATED

£

.-.t;If
",Qf

day of September, 2010.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

~~

~~:2
~~:2

Scott McKay
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

rq

I CERTIFY that on September~, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:
mailed
;( hand de1iven~d
deliven~d
faxed
to
Office of the Director
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043
Mr. John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

~
~
ScottMcKay

~
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700 W. State Street
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Telephone:
(208) 334··4283
Facsimile:
(208) 334··4298
Idaho State Bar No. 3873

Clerk .
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk.
By KAlHY BIEHL
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Department of
Insurance
ofInsurance
IN THE DISTR1CT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

In the Matter of:
Case No. CV OC 1017486
TWO JINN, INC.'s
Request for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDER

TWO JINN INC., a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,
Petitioner,
vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE,
Respondent.

Respondent Idaho Department of Insurance (hereinafter "Department") opposes the
Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agency Order.

The Director of the Idaho Department of
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Insurance entered his Findings, Conclusions, and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling
on August 20,2010. Petitioner has filed its Memorandum in Support ofPetitioner's
of Petitioner's Motion to

Stay Final Agency Order (hereinafter "Petitioner's Memorandum") in support of its Petition.
This is the Department's response to that memorandum.
Whether to grant a motion to stay an action from an agency order is governed by Id;mo
Code § 67-5274 and I.R.C.P.
LR.C.P. Rule 84(m). Both references are similar in form. Section

67-5:~74

states: "the filing of the petition for review does not itself stay the effectiveness or enforcement
of the agency action. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon
appropriate terms." Idaho Code § 67-5274. It appears that Idaho's Supreme Court has not
reviewed the standards granting or denying a motion to stay an agency action on appeal.
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that, "[w]hen deciding whether to issue a s1ay,
... [the court will] considt:r (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that [it] is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absert a
stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. California Pharmacists Assn. v. Maxw.?llMaxw.?!lF.2d
Jolly, 563 F
.2d 847, 849-850 (2009) (citing Humane Soc'y of us. v. Gutierrez, 527 F.3d 788,
13
2113
789-90) (9 th Cir. 2008)). See, also, Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2]
(1987).
In a 2008 decision, the 9 th Circuit explained this standard. The Circuit noted in the C,lse
of Golden Gate Restaurant Assn v. San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, that
the standard for granting a stay is a continuum. At one end of the continuum, if
there is a "probability" or "strong likelihood" of success on the merits, a relatively
low standard of hardship is sufficient. {Citations omitted.]
omitted.} At the other end, if
"the balance of hardships tips sharply in ... favor" of the party seeking the stay, a
relatively low standard of likelihood of success on the merits is sufficient.
omitted.]
{Citation omitted.}
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Golden Gate Restaurant Assn v. San Francisco, 512 F.3d at 1119. Additionally, "'where the

public interest lies' must be considered separately from and in addition to whether the applicant
for a stay will be irreparably injured absent a stay." Cytosport, Inc., v. Vital Pharmaceutic1ls,
Inc., 617 F.Supp.2d, 1051, 1084 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (quoting Natural Resources De! Council v.
Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 863 (9 th Cir. 2007).

The Petitioner requested a declaratory ruling from the Department in a December 10,
2009, letter addressed to the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance, asking the
Department to,
declare that I.C. § 41-1042 does not preclude a bail agent or surety from entering
into an indemnity agreement at the time of the bail transaction which permits
recovery from a criminal defendant or third party indemnitor of actual expenses
later incurred in connection with the apprehension and surrender of a criminal
defendant who fails to appear in court.
Scott McKay, Esq., letter on behalf of Two Jinn, Inc., to the Director dated December 10, 2009,
asking for Declaratory Ruling, (hereinafter "Letter to Director dated December 10, 2009").

Attached to that letter is "Exhibit A," entitled "Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond
Danielson National Insunmce Company" (hereinafter "Indemnity Agreement"). Embedded in
that Indemnity Agreement and identified as "Paragraph Three" is the indemnity clause at issm: in
this proceeding, and it reads as follows:
THIRD: to reimburse [Two Jinn, Inc.] and Surety for actual expenses incurred
and caused by a breach by the Principal of any of the terms for which the
application and Bail Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities
incurred as a result of searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody,
incurred by [Two Jinn, Inc.] or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or
endeavoring to apprehend Principal, including legal fees incurred by [Two Jinn,
Inc.] or Surety in making application to a court for an order to vacate or to set
aside the order of forfeiture or Judgment entered thereon. However, no expenses
or liabilities incun'ed for recapturing or returning Principal to custody shall be
chargeable after entry of Judgment.
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See, Letter to Director dated December 10, 2009, Exhibit A.

In the words of the Petitioner, the

above quoted Indemnity Agreement,
obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to
agree to pay exp~~nses that might be incurred at a later date in the event the
criminal defendant breaches the bail bond agreement by failing to appear in court
as ordered and it becomes necessary to apprehend and return the defendant to
court.
Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 4. The Petitioner's Motion to Stay pending appeal should be

denied.
1. Has Petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the

merits?
Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, provides:
Collections and charges permitted. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this chapter [10, title 41, Idaho Code], a bail agent in any bail transaction shall
not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration
from any person, except for the following:
(a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer;
(b) To provide collateral;
(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection
with the bail transaction, limited to the following:
Expendiitures actually and reasonably incurred to verify underwriting
(i) Expenditures
information or to pay for notary public fees, recording fees, or necessary long
distance telephone or telegram fees; provided however, that the total of all
such expenditures reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and
(ii) Travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a bail
agent's place of business, which includes any city or locality in which the bail
agent advertises or engages in bail business, up to the amount allowed by the
internal revenue service for business travel for the year in which the travel
occurs.
(2) Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any charge
for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document all
expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement.
Idaho Code § 41-1042(1). With respect to charges for service, section 41-1042 further states:
Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any charge for
his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document all
expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement.
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.......
Idaho Code § 41-1042(2).

The Petitioner notes in its Memorandum that its Indemllity

Agreement, quoted hereinabove, "does not describe charges for the bail agent's service in the
bail transaction but, rather, describes the remedy available to Aladdin and its surety following the
bail transaction in the event of a breach of the agreement. ... [T]his agreement is only implicBted
implic(lted
... where the principal breaches his obligations by failing to appear as required in court."

Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5. The Petitioner further asserts that "Idaho Code § 41-1042
does not apply to an agreement to pay the contingent recovery expenses set forth in Ithe
Indemnity Agreement]." Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5. In other words, according to the
Petitioner, section 41-1042 permits bail agents to collect collateral to secure the bail bond,
"which necessarily contemplates that the parties may enter contracts describing remedies in the
event ofa breach of the bail bond agreement." Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5.
The Department differs with the Petitioner's observations. First of all, the indemllity
Three"') referenced above is embedded into the Indemnity Agreement and is a
clause ("Paragraph Three")

ofthe
part of
the bail transaction. See, Letter to Director dated December 10, 2009.
With regard to section 41-1042, task of statutory interpretation "begins with the litc:ral
words of a statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent. The words cf a
statute should be given

th(~ir
thc~ir

plain meaning, unless a contrary legislative purpose is expressec or

the plain meaning creates an absurd result." KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, -
-Idaho --, -- P.3d --, (Idaho 2010) (No. 36162) (WL 2927175) (Citation omitted).
The plain words of section 41-1042 govern the bail transaction in question. The pertinent
part of that section reads that "a bail agent in any bail transaction shall not, directly or indirectly,
charge or collect money or other valuable consideration from any person except for the
following: (a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer; (b) To provide

collate~al;
collate~al;
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(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection with the bail
transaction, limited to thl;!
thl~ following: [underwriting and related expenses and travel experses
(See, above)]." Idaho Code § 41-1042(1) (emphasis here).

As a part of the bail transaction, section 41-1042 governs the Petitioner's Indemnity
Agreement. In a bail transaction, "'Bail' means a monetary amount required by the cour: to
release the defendant from custody and to ensure his appearance in court as ordered." Idlho
Code § 41-1038(1). The term "bail bond" is defined as "a financial guarantee, posted by a bail
agent and underwritten by a surety insurance company, that the defendant will appear as
ordered." Idaho Code § 41-1038(3).
"A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one side and an
accused and his or her surety on the other." State v. Two Jinn, Inc., -- Idaho --, -- P.3d --, (May
19,2010 WL 1980405 (Idaho App.)) (subject to withdrawal) (quoting State v. Castro, 145 Idaho
993, 995, 188 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct.App. 2008)).

"The extent of the surety's

undertakin~,
undertakin~,

is

determined by the bond agreement and is generally subject to the rules of contract law and
suretyship." Id.
In a bail transaction involving the court where it sets bail to ensure the accused's
appearance, the bail agent may not directly or indirectly charge or collect money or other
valuable consideration eXI;ept to pay premiums, provide collateral, and reimburse for expenses
covered in section 41-1042(1)(c). "Collateral" is defined as "property of any kind given as
security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(4).
In its Memorandum, Petitioner notes correctly that section 41-1042 permits bail

agent~;

to

collect "collateral to secure the bail bond." Petitioner's Memorandum at p. 5. It does [lot
necessarily follow, however, that because section 41-1042 permits collateral to secure the bail
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contraclual
bond that the statute necessarily contemplates expansion of that definition to include contractual
remedies to secure payment of apprehension expenses as provided in "Paragraph Three."
Section 41-1042 permits collateral to be provided to secure a bail bond.

No 01her

valuable consideration from any person may be charged or collected other than what is set forth
forrr: of
in section 41-1042. The additional remedy the Petitioner is seeking to secure in the forn:
"Paragraph Three" is an attempt to collect other valuable consideration not permitted under the
express words of section 41-1042.
2. Will the applkant be irreparably injured absent a stay?
There is no irreparable injury if the Petitioner is compliant with the law. As the sta1ute
clearly states, the bail agent in a bail transaction may not directly or indirectly charge or coLect
money or other consideration outside of what is permitted by law. The Indemnity Agreem ent
cannot be included in the bail transaction. It is that simple.
The Petitioner will not be forced to cease apprehension efforts. The Department has not
taken that position. Simply stated, the Petitioner is barred from collecting "other consideration"

within the bail transaction. The law does not prevent the Petitioner from entering into an
agreement outside of the bail transaction to secure apprehension costs.
3.

Public Interest.

The Constitution of the State of Idaho provides that all persons shall be "bailable by
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses," not in excessive amounts. Const. art. vi, § 6.
The purpose of bail is to e:nsure the appearance of defendants before the court and to protect the
right of defendants to bail. Idaho Code § 19-2902(2). It is also the public policy of the statt: of
Idaho to regulate bail agents because bail agents "provide an important local retail service to the
retail consumers of bail bonds; [there should be] a uniform and consistent regulatory framewl)rk
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that governs retail bail practices; and [t]here is a need to provide consumer protection fi'Om
unscrupulous and unfair practices." Idaho Code § 41-1037(1) and (2).
The foregoing constitutional and statutory citations state the public interest regarding the
bail bond transactions. Compliance with these laws and section 41-1042 furthers the pUJlic
interest as expressed by Idaho's Legislature.
In conclusion, the Department believes the Petitioner will not likely prevail at hearing on
the merits of this matter and that there is no irreparable harm demonstrated when the Petiticner
complies with the Final Order on file herein. Therefore, the Motion to Stay the Final Older
pending final judgment on appeal should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

Ia£day of

Seft", b<~
~~ 2010.
Se~t,w
2010,
ATTORl\TEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF ATTOR1\TEY

~~
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have, on this

11~day of

&deuckr
I

2010,

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following by the
designated means:

1ZI first class mail
D certified mail
D hand delivery
D via facsimile

Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

(
I
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WILLIAM W. DEAL
Director
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0043
Telephone: (208) 334-4250
Facsimile: (208) 334-4298
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TWO lINN, INC, a Califomia corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,

Case No. CV OC 1017486
NOTICE OF LODGING AGENCY
RECORD AND TRANSCIUPTS

Petitioner,
vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Respondent.

COMES NOW the Director of the Department of Insurance, by and through his
undersigned assistant, and notifies the Court and parties that the Department has lodged the
Agency Record, including transcripts from the proceedings before the Department, in the Metter
of Two linn, Inc.'s Request for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042, Docket
No. 18-2579-09, and certifies that a copy of the record is available for pick up and review at the
j(;~es
address set forth below. Petitioner shall pay the Department of Insurance the balance of the H!es

for preparation of the record in the amount of Seven and 95/100ths Dollars ($7.95).

'/
v
,
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DATED this !5cX~day of September 2010.

WILLIAM W. DEAL
Director, Idaho Department of Insurance

By:

~

j

u--<-~ {:/~
{:/~
u--<-~
TERESA JONES
Assistant to the Director
Idaho Department of Insurance

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this tWay of September 2010 caused a true md
correct copy of the foregoing notice to be served upon the following by the designated means:

~st class mail
D certified mail
D hand delivery
D via facsimile

Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, Md(AY & BARTLETT, LLP

P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

D first class mail
D certified mail

John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 W. State St., 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

[!?hand delivery

D via facsimile

J

1

~~
/'< .
TE~SA JONES
Assistant to the Directoi·

AGI~NCY RECORD AND TRANSCRIPTS - Page 2
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l~~_FIL~.~I_.______.. ___
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

In the Matter of:
TWO JINN, INC.'S RHquest for
Declaratory Ruling Re!garding Idaho
Code § 41-1042,

Case No. CVOC1 017486

ORDER GOVERNING
JUDICIAL REVIEW
TWO ... .liNN,
IINN, INC., a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
Doing business As Aladdin Bail Bonds
and Anytime Bail Bonds,
Petitioner,
vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE,
Respondent.

Petition for Judicial Review having been filed herein, and it appearing that th 3
issues presented on appeal are questions of law and fact; and it further appearing that a
record/transcript is necessary to process this appeal:
It is ORDERED:
1) That upon completion of the record the agency shall mail or deliver a notice of
lodging of transcript and record to all attorneys of record or parties appearing in person
and to the district court.
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 1
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2) That the notice shall inform the parties before the agency that they pick up a
copy of the transcript and record at the agency and that the parties have fourteEln
fourteEin (14)
days from the date of the mailing of the notice in which to file with the agency any
objections, and the notice will further advise the petitioner to pay the balance of ttU- e fees
for preparation before the transcript and record will be delivered to the petitioner.
3) That the A!Jency shall transmit the settled transcript and record to the district
court within forty-two (42) days of the service of the petition for judicial review.
4)

That the Agency, upon filing with the Court the record, shall send nctice of

such filing to all parties;
5) That the Petitioner's brief shall be filed and served within thirty-five (35) clays of
the date the transcript and record are filed with the Court.
6) That the RI9spondent's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eig 1t (28)
days after service of Petitioner's brief.
7) That Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twerty-one

(21) days after service of Respondent's brief.
8) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument after all briHfs are
filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither part~1 does
so, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and the
record.
th

Dated this 20 day of September, 2010.

~f (j ffltUt...-ffltih...-
KATHR
STICKLEN
Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 20

th

day of September, 2010, I mailed (served) a true

and correct copy of the within instrument to:

JOHN C. KEENAN
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0043

SCOTT MCKAY
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
PO BOX 2772
BOISE, ID 83701

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

BY: _ _ _.J.-_~~----IT_
By:
-"--_~~____IT_---
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ftECE\VED
f\ECE\VED

1.mO
SEP 1. ~ 1.0'0
Ada Co

unty c\er\(
c\erk
NAVA!1F10,, C,erk
C,Sri<
" DAVie NAVAl1FlO
By A. GAR PEi"
DEPIJT'
DEPIH'

WILLIAM W. DEAL
Director
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0043
Telephone: (208) 334-4250
Facsimile: (208) 334-4298

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TWO JINN, INC, a Califomia corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,
Petitioner,

Case No. CVOCI017486

AMENDED NOTICE OF LODGING
AGENCY RECORD AND
TRANSCRIPTS

vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Respondent.

COMES NOW the Director of the Department of Insurance, by and through

.1IS

alllended notice that lhe
undersigned assistant, and provides the Court and parties with an anlended
Department, on September 15, 2010, lodged the Agency Record, including transcripts from lhe
proceedings before the Department, in the Matter of Two Jinn, Inc.'s Request for Declaratc,ry
Ruling Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042, Docket No. 18-2579-09, and a Notice of Lodging was
recc>rd
mailed to the parties on that date and filed with the Court on September 16, 2010. The recc,rd
was received by counsel for Petitioner on September 20, 2010, at which time Petitioner paid the
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balance of the fees for preparation of the record. The record was received by counsel for
Respondent on September 16, 2010.
Pursuant to Rule 84(j), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court's Order Governing
Judicial Review, the parties are informed that they have fourteen (14) days from the date oflhe
mailing of the initial

notict~

in which to file with the agency any objections to the record.

DATED this--.;8"/1jay
this--.;8/11ay of September 2010.
WILLIAM W. DEAL
Director, Idaho Department ofInsurance

By:

~dA.t-, ~

TERESA JONES
/
Assistant to the DirecttH'/
Idaho Department of Insurance
,

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on thi~day of September 2010 caused a true a[ld
arld
correct copy of the foregoing notice to be served upon the following by the designated means:
[0'first class mail
[01irst
D certified mail

Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP

D

hand delivery

P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

D via facsimile

John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 W. State St., 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

D first class mail
D certified mail
[J11iand delivery

D via facsimile

~~

TERESA JONES
Assistant to the DireeW'
DirecW'
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-

-'

: .. J

1/ J0

tL~_.___-

-__", _'.

WILLIAM W. DEAL
Director
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0043
Telephone: (208) 334-4250
Facsimile: (208) 334-4298

DISTlUCT
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TWO JINN, INC, a Califomia corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,

Case No. CV OC 1017486

CERTIFICATE OF AGENCY RECORD

Petitioner,
vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF

n~SURANCE,
n~SURANCE,

Respondent.

I, Teresa Jones, Assistant to the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance, hereby

certify that the record and transcripts filed herewith contain true and correct copies of the
materials and documents maintained by the Idaho Department of Insurance as the agency record
in the above entitled case, in accordance with Idaho Code § 67-5249.
DATED this~lay of September 2010.
STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

\!/
\!/

~L..U~

j
/~

<? ,',
.' .

TERESA JONES
Assistant to the Direct6rDirect6r- .'
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_.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this~day of September 2010 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATE OF AGENCY RECORD to be served upon the
following by the designated means:

[8] first class mail

Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe

D certified mail
D hand delivery
D via facsimile

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP

P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

D first class mail
D certified mail

John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 W. State St., 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

[8] hand delivery
D via facsimile

j

J~A--?"---'

/~~

TERESA JONES
..,;/
Assistant to the Director
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-.
Scott McKay (ISB#4309)
Robyn Fyffe (lSB#7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 8370
83701I
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274
smckay@nbmlaw.com
rfyffc@nbmlaw.com

SEP 30 2010

Attomeys for Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of:
TWO JINN, INC.'s
Request for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 4J -1042

)
)
)
)
)

._----)

TWO JINN, INC, a Califomia corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds;
Peti titioner,
oner,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-201O-17486

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO STAY FINAL
AGENCY ORDER

)
)
)
)

)
)

Ys.
vs.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE)
Respondent.

)
)

----------------)

1·
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AY
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I. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The Respondent Idaho Department of Insurance's ("DOl") interpretation of I.C. § 41
41-

1042 - as described in the DOl Director's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for
Declaratory Ruling ("Final Order")l - is contrary to the statute's plain language and intemall y
inconsistent. Accordingly, there is a strong likelihood that Petitioner Two linn, Inc. (hereinafter
"Aladdin") will prevail on its petition for judicial review. Further, Aladdin will suffer

irrepa~able
irrepa~able

injury if the Court denies the instant motion because it is unable to continue entering indemnity
agreements during the bail transaction that provide for reimbursement for expenses incurred in
attempting to re-capture a defendant in the event the defendant fails to appear in Court
("apprehension costs"). The public's interest in ensuring the presence of criminal

defendant~
defendant~

in

COUlt also suffers if Aladdin is no longer able to contract for the recovery of apprehension co;ts.
In opposing Aladdin's motion, the DOl offers the same erroneous interpretation of I.e. §

41-1042 that it presented to the Director, fails to provide a meaningful response to Two linn's
in"eparable injury and fails to refute the manner in which the public interest will
assertion of in·eparable
suffer absent a stay of the Final Order. The Court should therefore grant Aladdin's motion and
stay the effectiveness of the Final Order pending the outcome of the petition for judicial review.

A.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The third paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond (hereinafter

"Indemnity Agreement" or "Paragraph Three"), which obligates the indemnitor (the criminal
defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to agree to reimbursement of apprehension costs in the

1 The agency record and transcripts were transmitted to the Court on September 29,2
29,2')10.
')10.
See Certificate of Agency Record dated September 29, 2010.
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event of breach, does not set forth charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction
within the meaning of I.C'. § 41-1042. Further, the statute's provision permitting collateral
reinforces that bail agents are permitted to contract for their remedies in the event of a breach of
the bail bond. Accordingly, Aladdin is likely to prevail on the novel legal issue presented in the
instant petition for review.

1.

Paragraph Three does not describe charges for the bail agent's service in the
bail transaction

Pursuant to I.e.
I.C'. § 41-1042(1), a bail agent must not charge or collect money or other
valuable consideration from any person except to pay premiums, to provide collateral, and to
reimburse the bail agent for certain enumerated expenses incurred in connection with the bail
transaction. The 001 claims that I.e.
I.C'. § 41-1042 precludes Paragraph Three because it is "pa 1 of
the bail transaction." Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agen:y
Order ("DOl's Opposition"), p. 5.
However, Section 41-1042 prohibits additional charges for the bail agent's "service in a
bail transaction." I.e.
I.C'. § 41-1042(2). Regardless of whether it is signed during the bail
transaction, Paragraph Three does not describe charges for the bail agent's senJice in that
transaction. Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not apply to an agreement to pay the contingent
recovery expenses set forth in that paragraph in the event there is a breach of that agreement.
Unlike the breach remedies described in the Indemnity Agreement, a bail agent's service
in the bail transaction includes tasks such as gathering information concerning a criminal
defendant's background, ties to the community, family ties, criminal history, credit history, the
financial wherewithal of all those involved as well as other relevant factors in evaluating the risk

3·
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posed by executing a particular bond. For their part, the consumer is required to pay the
premium and to reimburse the bail agent for certain delineated expenses. Locating and
apprehending a defendant who later absconds, which neither Aladdin nor its surety is legally
obligated to do under the bail bond, is not part of the bai I agent's "service in a bail transactio 1."
Rather, the services to which Section 41-1042 necessarily refers are those associated with selling
the bail bond to the principal and effectuating his release from jail.

2.

The statute's collateral provision contemplates that bail agents will contract
for their remedies in the event of breach at the time of the bail transactio'l
transactio'}

The statute's express provision permitting bail agents to collect collateral to secure the
bail bond contemplates that the parties may enter a contract identifying the available remedies in
the event of a breach of the bail bond agreement. The DOl contends that the statute's collateral
provision does not "necessarily contemplate[] expansion of' the definition of collateral to include
contractual remedies to secure payment of apprehension costs. DOl's Opposition, p. 7. No
"expansion" is suggested by Aladdin's argument. Section 41-1042 does not enumerate the
promise to pay the forfeited bond as an allowable "charge" yet it is undisputed by the DOl th 1t
lt
bail agents can require that promise. See Final Order, p. 7-8. The promise to pay apprehensicm
costs is no different. Neilther promise to pay is an enumerated charge in Section 41-1042 because
neither represents a charge for the bail agent's service during the bail transaction and the statute
has no application to either remedy.
The DOl acknowledges that a bail agent can require collateral to secure the bail bond but
claims "the additional remedy [Aladdin] is seeking to secure in the form of 'Paragraph Three' is
an attempt to collect other valuable consideration not permitted under" Section 41-1042. Del's

4 •
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Opposition, p. 7. Collateral, however, is not a remedy but a means of satisfying a remedy. That
collateral may be given to "secure the bail bond" does not limit application of such collateral to
only payment of the forfeited bond but, rather, contemplates that collateral can be applied to
redress damages caused by a criminal defendant's breach of the bail bond by failing to appear in
court.
The DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 is internally inconsistent as neither the
promise to pay the bail bond in the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay investigative costs
41-J042 as an allowable charge. The DOl's interpretation is contra'y to
is enumerated in Section 41-1042
the statute's plain language and Aladdin is likely to prevail on the merits of the instant petiticn
for review.

B.

Respective Risk of Injury to the Parties
Because Aladdin has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, it is

required to demonstrate a lesser degree of irreparable injury to obtain a stay of the Director's
'II v. City alld County of San Francisco, 512 F. 3d
Final Order. See Golden Gate Restaurant Ass 'n

1112,1116
1112.1116 (9th Cir. 2008) (the required degree of irreparable harm decreases as the probabilty
of success increases). With that said, the degree of injury Aladdin will suffer if the Final Order
remains effective pending the instant petition for review is significant and irreparable.
Conversely, neither the DOl nor the public will be harmed by maintaining the status quo and
entering a stay as requested by Aladdin.
The DOl responds to this argument by broadly asserting no irreparable injury will flow if
Aladdin is "compliant with the law" and that the Final Order will not force Aladdin to cease

5·
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apprehension efforts. DOl's Opposition, p. 7. Initially, whether compliance with the Final Clrder
is necessary to comply with "the law" is at issue in the instant petition for review. As set forh
above,

I.e. § 41-1042 does not preclude the indemnity agreement utilized by Aladdin. In an;'

event, the DO ['
l' s assertion that compliance with the Final Order equates to compliance with' the
law" is not responsive to Aladdin's arguments that it will suffer ilTeparable injury if the stay

IS

denied.
The 001 further contends that Aladdin will not suffer ilTeparable injury because it "v. ill
not be forced to cease apprehension efforts" and it can enter agreements providing for
reimbursement of such expenses "outside the bail transaction." DOl's Opposition, p. 7. Thi:;
Thi:.
position is unrealistic and does not refute Aladdin's assertion of ilTeparable injury. Although the
Final Order does not require Aladdin to cease apprehension efforts, it precludes it from seeki 19
reimbursement for the expenses associated with those efforts pursuant to an agreement enterEd at
the time the bail bond is purchased. Aladdin can continue investigating the whereabouts of
COlu1 at its own expense or it can simply collee t
absconders and returning those absconders to COl111
the amount of the forfeiture from the indemnitor - a third party or the criminal defendant. nus,
Aladdin's financial incentive to prevent the forfeiture from becoming final by sun-endering

t~e

defendant is significantly diminished.
The DOl's claim that Aladdin can enter indemnity agreements regarding apprehension
apprehensioll
costs after the bail bond is purchased and the criminal defendant has disappeared ignores the
realities of the situation. While Aladdin at times requires a third party indemnitor, the criminal
defendant is always required to agree to pay apprehension costs. The suggestion that Aladdin

6·
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should locate an absconding criminal defendant and then convince that person to agree to
reimbursement of investigative expenses caused by their breach is unrealistic and unreasonable.
In arguing that a stay is warranted, Aladdin noted that neither the DOl nor the public will
be injured by maintaining the status quo pending resolution of the instant petition for review.
The DOl presents no argument in response and fails to identify any injury it will suffer if AI:::ddin
is permitted to continue utilizing an indemnity agreement permitting the recovery of
apprehension costs. Nor could it, particularly in light of Aladdin's acknowledgment that
apprehension costs must not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond. See,

e.~.

I.e. ~ 41-1043 (collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond).
Aladdin will suffer irreparable injury if the Final Order remains effective whereas the
public and the DOl do not risk any comparable harm. The Court should grant the instant motion
to stay.

C.

Public Interest
Granting Aladdin's requested stay serves the public interest by ensuring the

accused'~:
accused'~:

presence in court. Conversely, if Aladdin can no longer recover apprehension costs, it has nCi
incentive, or at least a significantly reduced financial incentive, to locate and return a
financial incentive.
criminal defendant to court, particularly considering that the law clearly allows it to recover the
full amount of the forfeited bond. If Aladdin's only remedy is to obtain reimbursement for the
entire forfeiture, as a maHer of sound business practice, it may choose to not pursue investigative
efforts and simply collect payment of the entire forfeited bond. This result not only fails to
protect the public, it thwarts the bail bond's purpose of ensuring the defendant's appearance in

7·
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court.
The DOl provides no meaningful response to Aladdin's argument and, instead, simpl y
indicates that compliance with its interpretation of I.e. § 41-1042 furthers the public interest in
protecting consumers from unscrupulous and unfair practices. The DOl fails to explain how its
interpretation addresses unscrupulous and unfair practices, especially given that bail agents are
clearly permitted to collect collateral to secure the entire amount of the bail bond and
reimbursement for apprehension expenses must not be excessive in relation to the face amount of
the bond.
Permitting Aladdin to continue entering indemnity agreements permitting the recovery of
apprehension expenses furthers many of the public policy considerations at issue. Accordingly,
the public interest lies in granting Aladdin the requested stay.

II. CONCLUSION
The instant petition for review presents a novel legal issue that has been the subject

0

0

good-faith discussions with the DOl for a number of years. The plain language of the statute
demonstrates a strong likelihood that Aladdin will succeed on the meJits and the financial ha om
Aladdin will suffer if unable to recover apprehension costs is irreparable. A stay serves the

public interest by providing bail agents and their surety with the financial incentive to locate md
retum absconding criminal defendants to court. It is therefore appropriate to maintain the status
retlll11
quo by staying the effectiveness of the Final Order pending judicial review. The C01ll1 shoulj
grant the instant motion to stay.
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j"""

DATED this :5 0 day of September, 2010.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Scott McKay
Attorneys for Two linn, Inc.
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.,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
artI CERTIFY that on September~, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the fore~;oing
document to be:

mailed

K

hand delivered
faxed

to
Mr. John C. Keenan
Deputy Attol11ey General
Idaho Depm1ment of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

~~
-------.
-~
-~

Scott McKay
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of:
TWO JINN, INC.'s
Request for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
TWO JJNN, INC, a California corporation )
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and )
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and )
)
Anytime Bail Bonds;
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
-----

Case No. CV-OC-201O-17486

ORDER GRANTING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
STA Y FINAL AGENCY ORDER
STAY

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE)
)

Respondent.
)
._-----)
Petitioner Two Jinn, Inc., having moved the CouJ1
COllI1 for its order staying enforcement of the
Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling issued by the Idaho
Department of Insurance on August 20,2010 in the matter styled In the Matter of Two linn,

Inc. 's Requestfor Declaratory Ruling Regarding Idaho

Code.~
Code,~

41-1042,001 Docket No. 18
18-

2579-09, and the Court having determined that good cause to grant the motion exists. IT IS
ORDERED that enforcement of the Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for

1 • ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL AGENCY ORDEn

OR IG\
t~AL
IGl000055

Declaratory Ruling is hereby STAYED pending resolution of Two linn's petition for judicial
review of the same.
DATED

this~~_ day of October, 2010.
this~~.

2 • ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STAY FINAL AGENCY

ORDEI~
ORDEI~
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

~01O,

I CERTIFY that on October £Z01O, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:

~mailed

--'y?mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID
ill 83701
John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Depmtment of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
ill 83720-0043
Boise, ID

()C~~~_./
U~~~_./
Deputy Clerk
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~l~ICLO~IL~I~YK: =~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~1~IC:LO~IL~I~YK:
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
'
{l':l'"
20
1~".
. ..!,
. 10
)
In the Matter of:
-ot[.M\\(~ I'Jf1Mt)flRJ,
Nf1Mt)flRJ, Clerk
Case No. CV -ot[.M\\(~
)
TWO JINN, INC.'s
-~.ypAfP,'!6AAvDWI)NCH
-~.ypAfP,'!6~AvDW,)NCH
rJEPUTV
)
Request for Declaratory Ruling
)
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042
)
.;

,11><f
111><1
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-..

(;,

.

------ )

III

TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds;

)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

III'
III'

)

)
)

vs.
Ys.

)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE)

...

)

Respondent.
------------

-

)

)

PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF

•

Petition tor Judicial Review lrolll
Idaho Department of Insurance

Director's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order

•

..
..

-

William Deal, Director

Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVTN,
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
(20S) 343-1000

John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Tclaho 83720-0043
Boise, Idaho

Attollleys for Petitioner

Attolllcys for Respondent

..

'
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a petition for judicial review of a final agency action of the Idaho Department of
Insurance. Relief should be granted because the Director for the Idaho Department of Insumlce
erred by declaring that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes bail agents and their surety from entering

•

..•
•

into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction which permits recovery of
apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required in court.
court .
B. Procedural History
On December 10,2009, Petitioner Two linn, Inc., which does business in Idaho as

•
•

Aladdin and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Two linn" or "Aladdin") petitioned the Idaho
Department of Insurance (hereinafter "DOl") for a declaratory ruling pursuant to Idaho Code §
67-5232(1) asking the DOl to declare that Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not preclude a bail agent

•
•

or its surety from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bai I transaction which
permits the recovery of actual expenses later incurred in connection with the apprehension ard
surrender of a criminal defendant as a result of that criminal defendant's failure to appear in court
slilTender

•

as required. R 1.

DOl assigned the matter to a hearing officer. R 53. The parties submitted briefs and
The 001

stipulated to the relevant underlying facts and the hearing officer heard oral argument on March
8,2010. R 1, 14,57; Transcript dated March 8, 2010. On April 1,2010, the hearing officer

.t..t'

-

issued her "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order" finding that Idaho
Code § 41-1042 precludes agreements providing for reimbursement of apprehension and
surrender costs because those costs are not expressly delineated as permitted charges for the bai
hai I

•
1

•
•
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,
,

,.,"

II.II_

-

agent's service in a bail transaction. R 69.
On April 14,2010, Aladdin filed a Petition for Review of Preliminary Order with the
Director of the DOl and a brief in support of this Petition. R. 83, 91. The DOl elected to nol
n01

•

submit further briefing. R 102. The Director heard oral argument on July 21, 2010. Transcript

-

dated July 21, 2010. On August 10,2010, the Director issued his Findings, Conclusions and

•
•

•

Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling ("Final Order"), which ordered that bail agent s
and sureties are precluded by Idaho Code § 41-1042 from entering into indemnity

agreement~ for
agreement~

the reimbursement of apprehension costs contemporaneously with the bail transaction. R 10'),
121.
Aladdin timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review with this C0U11 pursuant to I.R.C.P.
84(m) and Idaho Code § 67-5270 on September 3,2010. Aladdin contemporaneously filed a

•

•

•

•

motion to stay the Final Order and on October 4, 2010, following a hearing on Aladdin's moion
to stay, this Court entered an Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agency Order
pending resolution of Aladdin's petition for judicial review.
Fact~
C. Statement of Fact~

The facts below were uncontested and presented to the hearing officer at the hearing

01

March 8, 2010. Tr. pp. 6-7; also R 69-71, 110-111. Petitioner Two Jinn does business in the
State of Idaho as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds. Tr. pp. 6-7. Two Jinn is licensed
by the State of Idaho as a producer of bail surety insurance. ld. at 6. Danielson National
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Danielson") is authorized as an·
an- insurer by the State ofIdaho and
Danielson's authorized lines of insurance include surety insurance. ld. Aladdin utilizes bail

-

bonds issued by Danielson in connection with its pretrial release services and to that end, uses a

•

2

•
•
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•

-

-

•

•

•
•

form entitled "Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond." [d.; R 11-13, 70, Ill. The Thirc
Paragraph of this Indemnity Agreement requires the contracting parties:
THIRD: To reimburse [Aladdin] and Surety for actual expenses incurred and
caused by a breach by the Principal of the terms for which the Application and Bail
Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities incurred as a result of
searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody, incurred by [Aladdin]
or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or endeavoring to apprehend Principal,
including legal fees incurred by [Aladdin] or Surety in making application to a
court for an order to vacate or to set aside the order of forfeiture or Judgment
entered thereon. However, no expenses or liabilities incurred for recaptUling or
returning Principal to custody shall be chargeable after the entry of Judgment.
R. 12,70.

If an individual is arrested for an alleged criminal offense, the individual can be

•
•

releas~d

from actual custody upon posting bail. R 70 citing Idaho Code § 19-2906. Bail may be posted by
filing a bail bond, a propelty bond, or a cash deposit. R 70 citing Idaho Code § 19-2907(1) ar d
I.C.R.
LC.R. 46(f)(1). If a bail bond is posted and the criminal defendant fails to appear for court as

•

•

ordered, the court wi II order the bai I forfeited. R 70 citing Idaho Code § 19-2915. Idaho Code §
19-2914 empowers the surety insurance company or its bail agent to arrest the criminal defendant
anytime before the bail has been exonerated. R 70-71 citing Idaho Code § 19-2914. The

•

forfeiture of the bail is cxonerated if the climinal defendant is brought before the court within J 80

days following the order forfeiting the bail. R 71 citing Idaho Code § 19-2922(5).
The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement allows Aladdin and Danielson to
recover costs expended by them in apprehending and returning a criminal defendant to custody
who has failed to appear in COUlt as required. R 71. The declaratory ruling issued by the DOl

-

interpreting Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits Aladdin from utilizing its Indemnity Agreement
during the bail transaction for this purpose. The Final Order specifically holds:

•
3

•
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•

-

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that
a bail agent or surety is precluded by Idaho Code § 41-1042 from entering into
indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the
Indemnity Agreement, Exhibit A to the December 10,2009, letter request for
declaratory ruling, contemporaneous with the bail transaction, i.e. the writing of the
bail bond, or from requiring any party to enter into such an indemnity agreement in
order to maintain the validity of the bail bond.

•
R 121.

•

•

III. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should this Court reverse the Final Order because the DOl's declaration that Idaho Code §
41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail

•
transaction which permits collection of apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal

•

defendant fail to appear as required is unreasonable and prejudices Aladdin's substantial rights?

IV. ARGUMENT

•
•

•

A. The DOl's Declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 Prohibits Aladdin From Entering Into 8n
(In
Indemnity Agreement at the Time of the Bail
Bai I Transaction Which Permits Collection of
Apprehension Costs ShOLt:ld
Shou:ld a Defendant Fail to Appear in Court is Unreasonable

1.

Stallda
Standa rd of Review

An agency's decision may be overturned if it was: "(a) in violation of constitutional or

•

statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unla,vful
unlu,v/"ul

procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).

-

The judiciary is free to correct errors of law in an agency's decision. Mercy Medical

Center
v. Ada County, Bd. of: 146 Idaho 226, 229,
192 P.3d 1050,1053
1050, 1053 (2008); Love v. Bd. of
229,192
Centerv.
County Comm'rs of
Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558, 559,671 P.2d 471, 472 (1983).
ofBingham
Nevertheless, an agency's interpretation of its statutes is entitled to deference according to the

•
4

•
•
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-

.,.

•

•

four-prong test set forth in Simplot v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206
(1991): (1) the court must determine whether the agency has been entrusted with the responsihility
to administer the statute at issue, (2) the agency's statutory construction must be reasonable, 0)
the court must determine that the statutory language at issue does not treat the precise issue, ald
(4) the court must ask whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are

present. See also Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine,
137 Idaho 107, 113,44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2002). Only if this test is met must the court give
"considerable weight" to the agency's interpretation. Pearl, 137 Idaho at 113,44 P.3d at 116g;

Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219.

•
•

Jaw rests .vith
Nith
The ultimate responsibility to construe legislative language to determine the law
the judiciary, and the underlying consideration whether or not such deference is granted is to

ascel1ain and give effect to legislative intent. Sons & Daughters of Idaho, Illc. v. Idaho, 144 Ijaho

•
•

23,26, 156 P.3d 524,517 (2007); Simplot, 120 Idaho at 853-54,820 P.2d at 1210-11. "An agt:ncy
construction will not be followed if it contradicts the clear expressions of the legislature becaL.se
'the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

•

Congress.'"
Congress.'" Simplot,
Sill/plot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 121, citing Chevron, U.S.A, Illc.

1'.

Nature'!

ResOllrces Defellse Council,
COl/ncil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984).
Resources

2.

41 -1042 is Unreasonable Because tile
The DOl's Interpretation of Idaho Code ~ 41-1042
Idaho Legislature Did Not Intend By this Statute to Limit a Bail Agent's Ability to
(Ill Indemnity in the Event ofa Breac,'l
Recover Apprehension Costs Pursuant to WI
Breac.'l

The first prong of the test set forth in Simplot is present in this case because the DOl is

-

..

entrusted to administer the Insurance Code which includes Idaho Code § 41-1042. However,is
However, is
more fully discussed herein, the DOl's interpretation of this statute is not entitled to "considenble

5
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-

weight" because it is unreasonable. The DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 is unreasoncble
because: (a) it is contrary to the plain language of this statute; (b) it is illogical and internally
inconsistent in that it pemlits bail agents to contract for one remedy in the event of breach - tte

•

agreement to pay the forfeiture - but not contract for another remedy in the event of breach - I.he

-

agreement to pay apprehension costs, where neither remedy is enumerated in Section 41-1042;
and (c) it thwarts the purpose of bail by providing bail agents a perverse disincentive to locate
absconders and instead simply to collect the forfeited bond from the indemnitor thus creating
significant public safety issues.

•
The rules of statutory construction confirm Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not preclude

•
•

recovery of apprehension costs pursuant to an indemnity agreement. In interpreting a statute, the
court first looks to the statute as written and determines whether the language is clear and
unambiguous. State

•
•

1'.

Esco/J{{r,
Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). If it is, the

language of the statute is given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. State v. Burnight, 132
Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless the
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results.

•

Driver v. S1 Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 427,80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). If the language is ambiguous,

mllst ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. See State v. Madden, 147
cou11s must
Idaho 886, 888, 216 P.3d 644, 646 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard rules of statutory construction

-

.

require deriving legislative intent by looking to the literal words of the statute, the content of those
words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. State v. Rhode, 133 Idat 0
459,462,988 P.2d, 645, 688 (1998). Further, "courts must construe a statute under the
assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at th ~

6

•
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•

time the statute was passed." D & M Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Romriell, 138 Idaho
160, 165,59 P.3d 965, 970 (2002).
The plain terms of Idaho Code § 41-1042 clearly and unambiguously apply to charges
assessed in connection with a bail transaction. The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement
does not set forth charges assessed in connection with the bail transaction and, instead, provides

•
•

•
•
•
•

for reimbursement of expenses in the event a contingency occurs - that is the criminal defendmt
fails to appear in court and thus breaches the terms for which the bail bond was written. Further,
the standard rules of statutory construction, including legislative history and public policy,
confirm a legislative intent to allow bail agents to contract for the recovery of contingent losses,
including apprehension expenses, at the time of the bail transaction.

a. The plain language of the statute does not preclude recovery of the breach
remedy reflected in Aladdin's indemnity agreement.
Idaho Code

~

41-1042 provides:

•

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent ill any
bail transaction shall not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or
other valuable consideration from any person except for the following:

•

(a) To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer;
(b) To provide collateral;

(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses inculTed
incuned in
connection with the bail transaction, limited to the following:

-

(i) Expenditures actually and reasonably incuned
inculTed to verify
underwriting information or to pay for notary public fees;
provided however, that the total of all such expenditures
shaH not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and
reimbursed shall
(ii) Travel expenses incuned
inculTed more than twenty-five (25)
miles from a bail agent's place of business, which includes
any city or locality in which the bail agent advertises or
engages in bail business, up to the amount allowed by the

•
7
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-

-

-

-

internal revenue service for business travel for the year in
which the travel occurs.
(2) Except as pennitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any
charge for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully
document all expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement.
(emphasis added).
Section 41-1042 limits charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction and i;
inapplicable to the Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement which obligates the indemnitor

•

•
•

(the criminal defendant and/or a third party guarantor) to agree to pay expenses that might be
incuned at a later date in the event the criminal defendant breaches the bail bond agreement by
failing to appear in court as ordered and it becomes necessary to apprehend and return the
defendant to custody. The Third Paragraph does not describe charges for the bail agent's service

•
•

in the bail transaction and Section 41-1042 does not apply to the agreement to pay contingent
recovery expenses set forth in that paragraph. This conclusion is reinforced by the statute's
express provision permitting bail agents to collect collateral to secure the bail bond, which

•
•

p<:uties may enter contracts describing remedies in the event of a
necessarily contemplates that the p<:l1ties
breach of the bai I bond agreement.
i. The Thi rd Paragraph does not descri be charges for the bai IJ agent's servi ce i flrl the

bail transaction
Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits a bail agent from "charg[ing] or collect[ingJ money

01

other valuable consideration" in any bail transaction except to pay premiums, to provide colla:eral
and to reimburse for certain enumerated expenses. This section only implicates charges for the

-

bail agent's "service in a bail transaction." See Idaho Code § 41-1042(2) ("a bail agent shall fot
rot
make any charge for his service in a bail transaction" except as pennitted under this section).

•
8
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•

-

concerning a criminal defendant's background, ties to the community, family ties, criminal

•

factors in evaluating the risk posed by executing a particular bond. The bail agent then negoti ates

-

the terms under which Aladdin is willing to execute the bai I bond, including requiring the

•

•

•

informal on
A bail agent's service in the bail transaction includes tasks such as gathering informat

history, credit history, the financial wherewithal of all those involved as well as other relevanl

defendant's participation in the supervised bail program, the provision of a third-party indemllitor
and collateral to secure the bond. The agreement to pay apprehension costs in the event of a
breach by the principal as provided in the Third Paragraph does not describe charges for the bail
agent's service in the bail transaction. Rather, the contingent costs described in this paragraph

•
•

concem the remedy available to Aladdin and its surety following the bail transaction which is
implicated only in those situations where the principal breaches his obligations by failing to
appear as required in court

•
•

That the Indemnity Agreement is entered into at the time of the bail transaction is of n J
import. See R 113 (Final Order, p. 5). The execution of the indemnity agreement at the time of
the bail transaction does not convert the contingent reimbursement set forth therein to "chargt[s]

•

for the [bai 1I agent's 1 service in a bai 1 transaction" within the scope of Section 41-1042. InsteHd.

regardless of the timing, the reimbursement set forth in the agreement concems contingent
expenses unrelated to charges incurred during the bail transaction.
Section 41-1042 clearly and unambiguously applies to charges assessed in connection with
a bail transaction, i.e., issuing and posting a bail bond. The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity

-

Agreement does not set forth charges assessed in connection with the bail transaction and, instead,
provides for reimbursement of expenses in the event the defendant breaches his obligations arid

•
9
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-

-

•
•

fails to appear in court. Thus, the plain language of Section 41-1042 does not preclude Aladdin
from entering indemnity agreements such as that set forth in this paragraph at the time of the I>ai
bai I
transaction.
ii. The Third Paragraph does not constitute "valuable consideration" prohibitd by
the statute
The DOl, also noted below that because the Third Paragraph constitutes a promise to pay
in the event of a breach, this at least constitutes "valuable consideration" not expressly permitted

•

•
•

by the statute. R 113-114 (Final Order. pp. 5-6). This argument is unavailing.
The Final Order acknowledges that a bail agent may contract with an indemnitor to be
liable for the face amount in the event of breach. See R 119 (Final Order, p. 11) (positing
hypothetical where the "indemnitor wants to limit his losses to being liable for the face amount or

•
•

the bond as previous!."\!
attempted recovery
previollsl,v promised but does not want to also be responsible for attcmpted
costs." (emphasis added)). This prior promise, of course, is obtained at the time of the bail
transaction and the DOl does not assert this promise to pay the forfeited amount of the bond ill thc
the

•
•

event of breach constitutes "valuable consideration." A promise to pay apprehension costs in the
bited by the statute if a promise
event of a breach cannot constitute "valuable consideration" prohi
prohibited
to pay the face amoLlnt
amount of the bond in the event of breach does not.
Further, it could be argued that innumerable matters associated with the Indemnity

-

-

-

Agreement uti lized by Aladdin or other bai I agents constitute "valuable consideration" not
described in Section 41-1042. For instance, bail agents require the principal to promise to apI=ear
in court as ordered, may require a third-party relative to sign an indemnity agreement in additi,)n
to the principal or may require the principal to agree to supervised bail where he or she is required

•
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-

to check in with the bail agent at specified times to ensure the principal is meeting his or her
obligations. See R 111-112 (Final Order, pp. 3-4) ("[I]t is not uncommon for a bail agent and

-

surety to require additional conditions beyond the fundamental requirement to appear at all

,.

part. of the issuance of the bail bond. Additional requirements can
required court hearings as part
include requiring the principal to periodically check in with the bail agents."). The DOl does not

•
•

dispute the appropriateness of such consideration even though none of the foregoing are
specifically enumerated in the statute.'
pc y
Nor should the DOl assert otherwise. None of the foregoing including a promise to p<:

•
the forfeited amount of the bond constitute a "charge" or attempt to "collect money or other

•

•

valuable consideration" in the bail transaction.
However, to the extent that the contingent agreement descri bed in the Third Paragraph is
"valuable consideration" charged in a bail transaction, it is a form of collateral expressly perrr:itted

•

by Idaho Code

~

41-1042(l)(b). "Collateral" means "property of any kind given as security te

obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(2). Black's Law Dictionary defines "collateral
security" as "a security, subordinate to and given in addition to a primary security, that is interlded

•

to guarantee the validity or convertibility of the primary security." BLACK'S LAW

(7111 ed. 2000). When a principal or third party indemnitor agrees to pay
DICTIONARY 1090 (7(11

expenses in the event of forfeiture of the bond as set f0l1h in Paragraph Three, that agreement is
given as security to obtain a bail bond and to guarantee the validity of the principal's promise

:0

...
, Indeed, counsel for the DOl staff agreed that many of the provisions contained in
Aladdin's Indemnity Agreement are acceptable including requiring the criminal defendant to
f<:ils
provide a third-party indemnitor who agrees to pay the bail bond in the event the defendant f'lls
to appear and requiring the defendant to agree to appear for all coul1 appearances and to
periodically check in with the bail agent. March 8,2010 Tr. p. 18, In. 9-22; p. 20, In. 22-24.
I

•
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-

appear as ordered by the court. Thus, if the Third Paragraph is "valuable consideration"

char~;ed
char~;ed

in a bail transaction, it falls squarely within the definition of collateral and is permissible purslant
to Idaho Code § 41-1042(1)(b).

•

b. Section 41-1042's collateral provision further demonstrates that the DOl's
interpretation of lthis statute is unreasonable

-

Idaho Code § 41-1042 permits bail agents to "collect money or other valuable
consideration" to "provide collateral." Idaho Code. § 41-1042(l)(b). As cited above, Title 4J

•
defines "collateral" as "property of any kind given as security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho C)de

•

•

§ 41-1038(2). This collateral may not be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond,

Idaho Code § 41-1043. Thus, rather than precluding a bail agent from contracting for remedies in
bail bond, Section 41-1042
the event of a breach of the criminal defendant's obligations under the bait

•

-

•
•

expressly contemplates the existence of such remedies by permitting bail agents to take collakral
from the consumer to protect against contingent losses.
A statute must not be construed in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions

included therein. Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568,571-72,798 P.2d 27,30-31 (1990). If
contingency agreements were barred by Section 41-1042 and bail agents were precluded from
requiring a criminal defendant or others to be responsible for expenses in the event of the bail's
forfeiture, there would be no need for collateral. Thus, to interpret Section 41-1042 as precluding

.~

-

bail agents from entering into indemnity agreements at the time of the bail transaction would
render those sections governing bail agents' acceptance of collateral during the bail transactio 1
mere surplusage.

12
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.

-

..•
..
•

•

Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not limit the remedies available in the event of a breach of the
bail bond nor does it limit the losses to which collateral may be applied in the event of a breach. 2
While the collateral must not be excessive in relation to the bond amount and there are
requirements regarding how it is handled,3 there is no limitation placed on a bail agent's ability to
apply this collateral towards a duly contracted for loss such as a forfeited bail bond or the costs of
apprehending a criminal defendant in order to prevent the forfeiture.
i. The DOI"s acknowledgment that a bail agent may contract for one remedy in
the event of breach - the agreement to pay the forfeiture - but not to contract for
another remedy in the event of breach - the agreement to pay apprehension costs,
where neither remedy is enumerated in Section 41-1042, is unreasonable and
illogical
The Final Order acknowledges that the collateral, which a bail agent is permitted to collect
41-1042(l)(b), is to secure the bail bond in the event offorfeiture.-l R 116. As
under Section 41-1042(1)(b),
previously noted, the Final Order also acknowledges that an indemnitor's liability for the face

•

.
•

or the bond may occur pursuant to the prior agreement of the parties. R 111.
Ill.)5 The DOl's
DOI"s
amount of
position is illogical. Section 41-1042 cannot be read to permit bail agents to contract for payment

C Paragraph Eight of the Indemnity Agreement utilized by Aladdin provides that any
collateral collected may be applied to the obligations, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and
expenses specified in the Agreement. R 12.

-'For example, collateral must be deposited and maintained in a separate trust account if
3For
b<lil
collateral is received in the form of cash or in a separate and secure location apalt from the btlil
agent's assets if not in cash. See Idaho Code §§ 41-1043(1) and (2)

-

•

-l Similarly, the Director at the July 21, 2010 hearing acknowledged that a bail agent may
apply collateral towards the amount of the forfeited bail bond - a position that the DOl has taken
throughout these proceedings. Tr. p. 15, I. 7 - p. 16, I. 8.
5) See Final Order, p. 11 (positing hypothetical where the "indemnitor wants to limit his
losses to being liable for the face amount of the bond as previously promised but does not want to
also be responsible for attempted recovery costs." (emphasis added)).
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of the entire bail bond but prohibit agents from contracting for reimbursement of apprehension
expenses incurred in order to avoid payment of the entire bail bond.
This interpretation is internally inconsistent as neither the promise to pay the bail bond in

•

the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay investigative costs is enumerated in Section 41-l042

-

as an allowable charge. Instead, Section 41-1042 has no application to either remedy because

•
•

neither represents a charge for the bail agent's service during the bail transaction. Accordingly,
the DOl's interpretation is contrary to the statute's plain language, unreasonable and not entitled
to deference.

•

•

..

.

c. The Idaho Legislature would not have adopted a statute that thwarted the
purpose of bail and created grave public safety issues
The public policy underlying bail bonds and encouraging the return of fugitives to cusody,
existing Idaho case law, the legislative history of Idaho Code

*41-1042 and authority from other

jurisdictions throughout the United States all establish that bail agents are entitled to contract for
the fair and reasonable value of costs inculTed
incurred in connection with apprehending and surrendering

•

sllch costs
a principal to the court's custody. Recognizing bail agents' ability to recover such

furthl~rs
fllrthl~rs

court and
the public policy underlying bail bonds by promoting the defendant's appearance in cOllrt
promotes public safety. Thus, even if the language of Section 41-1042 is ambiguous as to
whether it limited remedies pursuant to an indemnity agreement, which it is not, standard

rule~
rule~

of

statutory construction demonstrate that agreements such as Paragraph Three do not fall within the

-

statute's scope.

••
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•
•

i. Permitting the recovery of apprehension costs is consistent with the purpose of
bail and public policy which encourages the return of fugiti ves to custody
Prohibiting bail agents such as Aladdin from recovering expenses incurred in recaptur ng
and surrendering a defendant is contrary to public policy and creates significant public safety
issues. The primary purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused. State v. Quick
Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 2007). Bail agents

havl~

the

authority, and in fact are encouraged, to arrest a defendant who has missed a court appearance and

•
•

•

return him to court. See Idaho Code § 19-2914 (at any time before the exoneration of bail, thE:
surety insurance company or its bail agent ... may empower any person of suitable age and
discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the state"); Idaho Code § 19-2922 ("court
("courl
shall order the bail exonerated: if the "defendant has appeared before the COUlt within one hundred

•
•

eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture"); r.C.R. 46(h) (permitting court to set asidE
sevel al
forfeiture if it appears that j us1 ice does not require its enforcement after consideration of seve]
factors including "the participation of the person posting bail in locating and apprehending thE:
defendant").

•

The purpose of bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate
absconders and return them to the court. See County BOTzding Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 131
surEty
133 (Fla. App. 1998) ("The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the SurEty
has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant] is

-

to create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives"); Board of Com '15;
'1.'; of
Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. App. 2003) (Liberal interpretation of

•
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•

-

•

-

forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides incentives to sureties "to pursue those who flee the
jurisdiction").
It is axiomatic that there are costs associated with locating and apprehending absconding
criminal defendants. Further, it is not disputed that Aladdin can seek reimbursement for the
amount of a bail bond forfeiture. However, if Aladdin could not recover investigation costs,

~'et

could recover the amount of the forfeited bond, it has no financial incentive to locate and retu 11 a
criminal defendant to court. In such circumstances, the criminal fugitive remain free and pub ic

•

safety is compromised. Such a result is contrary to the bail bond's purpose of ensuring the
defendant's appearance in court and cannot be what the Idaho Legislature intended.

•
•

Flllther, the criminal defendant and his indemnitor's obligation under the Third Paragraph
FUlther,
provide an important incentive to the defendant to appear for court. If the criminal defendant
knows that neither he nor his indemnitors, often family or friends, will be financially responsi )Ie

•
•

in the event he absconds, he is more likely to skip bail. Similarly, if the indemnitors are
financially responsible if the defendant skips bails, they have a financial incentive to assist the
defendant in making it to court or to assist the bail agents in effectuating the defendant's surrender

•

,-

should he fail to do

SO.6

It also must be noted that the expense of apprehending and returning the principal to the
court is often less than the actual bond amount. In this instance, the indemnitor is better served
by funding the costs of apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as opposed to payirlg
the cost of the forfeited bond.
6(,
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•
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•
•

a.) The DOl's suggestion that apprehension cost be negotiated after th(~
breach has occurred is unrealistic and harmful to both the public and the
consumer
The Final Order asserts that a bai I agent should negotiate recovery of apprehension co;ts
co.;ts
after the breach has occurred. R 118-119 ("By permitting a bail agent to seek to enter into a new
transaction, albeit related to the bail transaction, for recovery of the principal including the
reimbursement of recovery and apprehension costs, the goals of encouraging recovery and
ensuring the presence of the defendant at court hearings are preserved."). The DOl's assertioll in
this regard is unrealistic and harmful to the public and the consumer.
In a bail transaction, there is often no third party indemnitor and, thus, it is only the
criminal defendant who agrees to be responsible for the forfeited bond. Of course, no bail agEnt is
going to investigate an absconding defendant's whereabouts for the purpose of negotiating thE
recovery of investigative expenses with that defendant - and no absconding defendant is going to

•

•

agree to reimbursement of expenses already incurred absent a prior agreement. In these scenmios,
the bail agent will let the forfeiture stand, particularly when there is collateral to secure the bail
bond or adequate assets against which ajudgment can be collected. In those instances, the bail
agent will have no incentive to return the fugitive to custody and the purpose of bail is thwarted.

Additionally, the parties should negotiate the liability and breach remedies relating to the
bail transaction on one occasion, just as with any other transaction. In no forum are breach
remedies negotiated after the breach has occurred. It would be altogether impractical and
unproductive for the parties to a car loan, a construction project or any other commercial
transaction to come together after a breach has occurred and attempt to agree to the remedies hr
that breach. Similarly, it is unrealistic to expect that a bail agent and a third party indemnitor will

17
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-

sit down at the table again after the breach has occurred and work out the breach remedies
including the apprehension costs the indemnitor will pay. A bail agent who can simply collect the
face amount of the bond from that indemnitor is unlikely to undertake the time and expense

0'

attempting to negotiate the recovery of apprehension expenses after a defendant has failed to

-

well as the consumerlindemnitor who financially benefits from payment of lower apprehension

•

costs rather than the full penal sum of the bond.

appear. Under this scenanio, the fugitive remains free to the detriment of the general public

b.) The DOl's concern over protecting the bail consumer from
unreasonable investigation costs is not compelling.

•

•

a~

The DOl's apparent concern involves the risk that bail bond consumers may be subjected
to unfair practices and, speci fically, the risk that a consumer may unknowingly be held liable (or

•
•

unreasonable apprehension costs. See, e.g. R 120 (Final Order, p. 12) ("The fact the charge is
latent and conditional does not necessarily assist the consumer or relieve the need to protect a
consumer. Rather, it is more critical to protect the consumer where significant investigative

•

01"
01'

apprehension fees and expenses may be incurred when the consumer is not aware of the likelihood

•

and is focused only on obtaining the defendant's release fromjail."). This concem is

-

unpersuasl ve.
Initially, Aladdin is unaware of any allegation that it has attempted to collect unreasofllble
unreasol11ble
apprehension fees. Indeed, Aladdin is already of the view that apprehension costs must not be
excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond. See, e.g. Idaho Code § 41-1043 (collateral

-

may not be excessi ve in relation to the face amount of the bond). In fact, the Final Order note;

•
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-

that in the legislative history underlying Section 1042, there were very few complaints concerning
bail bonds and of those complaints, most involved the handling of collateral. R. 114.
The DOl agrees that Aladdin can require an indemnitor to post collateral at the time of the

•

bail transaction to secure the entire amount of the bail bond. An additional promise - secured or

-

unsecured - to reimburse Aladdin for apprehension expenses incurred in returning an absconder
to court does not expose the defendant or his indemnitor to any additional risk of injury,

•

particularly where the total liability is limited by the face amount of the bond. Indeed, such

•

agreements protect the consumer and as discussed above serve a compelling public interest by
providing Aladdin and other bail agents with an incentive to re-capture the defendant and obtain

•

exoneration of the bond, rather than simply letting the forfeiture stand and collecting the

entifl~
entin~

•

amount of the bond from the indemnitor or defendant. Further, an indemnitor is better served by

.•

funding the costs of apprehension and return of the criminal defendant as opposed to paying the

•

higher cost of a forfeited bond.
The Final Order discusses two circumstances in which an indemnitor may prefer not tel
t(1
agree to reimburse apprehension costs notwithstanding these concems: (I)
(1) the indemnitor believes

•

that he wi!!
will have a better chance or convincing the defendant to appear or sUITender or (2) the

indemnitor believes that searching for the defendant would be futile so wants to limit his liahi,ity
to the face amount of the bond. R 119.
Preliminarily, the oveniding consideration should not be the preference of an indemnitor

II.

-

who has contractually agreed to pay apprehension costs in the event of a breach to not be
responsible for those costs after the breach has occurred. This indemnitor is often the criminal
defendant himself or it may be a family who does not want to see the climinal defendant retumed

•
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to custody. Further, this indemnitor had a choice whether to engage the services of a bail agent
and which bail agent to use. In Aladdin's case, Aladdin requires that this indemnitor agree th;lt if

there is a breach of the bail agreement, then the indemnitor is contractually liable to pay as a

•

remedy for that breach the actual and reasonable apprehension expenses incurred in returning the

-

principle who is now a criminal fugitive to custody. The more important policy consideration is
returning the criminal fugitive to custody which is accomplished by upholding the terms of

••

Aladdin's Indemnity Agreement.

•

However, even the DOl's two hypothetical circumstances do not present significant

ri~:k

for the bail bond consumec With respect to the first circumstance, Aladdin and other bail agents

•
•

investigativ(:
should as a matter of sound business practice attempt to utilize the least intrusive investigativt:

tactics to secure the surrender of the defendant, including contacting the indemnitor and
requesting his assistance in convincing the defendant to self-sun·ender.
self-sun"ender. If they do not and pur:;uc

•

•

collection of unreasonable apprehension cots, that consumer has a defense to payment of these
costs. See, e.g. Saladino

I'.

Stllyvesant Ins.
Ills. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), (holding
Stuyvesant

bail agent was entitled to recover expenses incurred in apprehending principal pursuant to

•

-

sllch expenses are the fair and reasonable; $4,000 investigator I"ec
indemnity agreement provided such

was unreasonable as the principal was residing with his wife without any attempt at concealm(:nt
concealm(~nt
and working at his regular employment). The second circumstance identified by the DOl is
addressed by Idaho

Code.;~
Code.;~

41-1043 which limits an indemnitor's liability for the forfeiture ard

apprehension costs.

-

Finally, the DOl expresses concern over the fact that family and friends are sometimes
involved in the bail process and are desirous of obtaining the release of the defendant and that

•
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-

these transactions sometimes take place outside of normal business hours. R 114 (Final

Orde~,

p.

-

6). As set forth above, the overriding policy consideration notwithstanding the possible

•_

defendant to custody. Further, most significant bonds are not posted at night. The typical bond

•
•

involvement of family in obtaining the bond should be the return of an absconding criminal

for a felony is determined by a judge during the day and the bail transaction is accomplished
during business hours. See Idaho Criminal Rules 4,5 and 46(c). Bonds posted at night are
generally for misdemeanors pursuant to a set schedule and the penal sum of the bonds for
misdemeanors are generally far less than for felonies. See Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 13.
Additionally, the DOl acknowledges that it is appropriate for a bail agent to obtain collateral in

•
•

connection with a bail bond and that collateral sometimes includes an indemnitor's home. Ar
additional promise to reimburse bail agents for apprehension expenses incuITed in the event

0'

a

discussed, often
breach does not dramatically alter the nature of the transaction and as previously discussed.

•
•

works to the significant advantage of the consumer by providing bail agents a financial incent ve
to return an absconder to court instead of simply letting the forfeiture stand and collecting the
entire amount of the bond from that indemnitor.

•

-

ii. Permitting the Recovery of Apprehension Costs is Consistent with the

Legislative History of Idaho Code

*41-1042

In addition to the plain language ofIdaho Code § 41-1042 and its underlying public policy,
this statute's legislative history establishes that the Idaho Legislature did not intend to

preclud,~
precludl~

indemnity agreements permitting the recovery of apprehension costs such as that contained in the
Third Paragraph. Prior to passing Idaho Code § 41-1042, the House Business Committee was

•

aware that this new legislation would mean that a party who pledged collateral in order to obtain a

•
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•

•_

-

..

•

•

bail bond on behalf of another could lose that collateral in the event the bail bond was forfeited.
The Committee minutes reflect the following:

Rep. Douglas presented an example of parents pledging title to their home as
collateral for a bond to bail out their child from jail, and asked whether the parents
would lose their home if the child skips bail. Mr. Duvall [charter president of the
Professional Bail Agents of Idaho] said that this would be the case.
H 62, February 11, 2003 House Business Committee Minutes. 7
Because the obligation to pay the bail bond only arises upon forfeiture, an agreement tJ
t)
pay that forfeiture necessarily arises as part of a separate indemnity agreement. Although Idaho
Code § 41-1042 does not explicitly permit recovery of a forfeited bond, such recovery is
permissible because reimbursement for a forfeited bond is not a charge assessed in connectior
with the bail
boil transaction. 8 Similarly, although Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not explicitly permit

•

reimbursement for expenses incurred in apprehending and surrendering a criminal defendant, such

•

reimbursement is also permissible pursuant to an indemnity agreement. It is nonsensical to

.

interpret Section 4 J -1042 as permi tting bai I agents to contract through an indemni ty agreemer t for
the recovery of a forfeited bond but forbidding bai I agents from contracting through an indemnity

•

-

7 See http://www.iegislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfoI2003/StandingCommittees/hbusmin.
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfoI2003/StandingCommittees/hbusmin.
html#feb 11.

Again, the DOl readily acknowledges that the bail agent may recover the forfeited bond
II ~,);
amount from the indemniltor pursuant to a prior agreement. Final Order, pp. 8, 11 (R 116, Il
Transcript from the July 21,2010 hearing before the Director for the DOL Tr. 15, I. 7 - Tr. 16, I.
6; see, also remarks by counsel for DOl at March 8, 2010 hearing (acknowledging that
"collateral" which the bail agent is permitted to collect during the bail transaction is to secure the
bail bond) Tr. p. 24, In. 4-5; (discussing loss of collateral posted by third patty indemnitor when
defendant absconds) Tr. 20, In. 22-24; (stating that "the person who put up the collateral to
secure that bond" has a stake in returning an absconder to court); Tr. 22, In. 1-8; and (arguing
that collateral is about securing the bond because Section 41-1043 connects collateral to the
amount of the bond) Tr. 22, In. 15-25.
8

'.
'.
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agreement for the recovery of apprehension costs, particularly when the statute is silent as to the
types of contingent losses to which collateral may be applied.
iii. The Idaho Supreme Court has Recognized the Propriety of Bail Agents
Recovery of Expenses Pursuant to an Indemnity Agreements
Courts must assume that the legislature knew of all legal precedent when passing a statute.
,UD & M Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 138 Idaho at 165,59 P.3d at 970. Idaho Code § ,0
1042 was passed in 2003, years after the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that bail agents ma/

•
•

•

recover expenses pursuant to the terms of an indemnity agreement in Martin v. Lyons, 98

Ida~o

102, 105, 558 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1977).
In Lyons, a third party entered into an indemnity agreement with the bail bond company
and later disputed its liability under this agreement. ld. The court determined the indemnific<tion
clause at issue was reasonably read as allowing the bail agents to be indemnified for "voluntary"

•

disbursements. ld. The Court reasoned that bail agents can recover consistent with the terms of
the indemnity agreement. Id. ("[I]f the indemnification clause agreed to by [the indemnitor] <Ind

•
•

[the bail agents] allows indemnification for payments that are not legally required of the bail
agents.
agents, then [the indemnitor] would be so obligated iITespective
inespective of whether the forfeiture of [t le
Principal's] bail was valid or invalid.") Because the legislature knew that the Idaho Supreme
acknowledged
bailI agents could recover voluntary disbursements pursuant to
Court had acknow
ledged that bai
indemnity agreements when it passed Idaho Code § 41-1042, and did not state the law should Je
otherwise, it is presumed that such recovery is sti 11 allowed. If this was not the case, the

-

legislature would have explicitly stated as such.

•
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-

iv. The DOl's Position Regarding the Recovery of Apprehension Costs is No\el
and Unsupported by Authority from Other Jurisdictions
The DOl's attempt to limit a bail agent's ability to contract for the recovery of
apprehension costs in the event of a later breach by a criminal defendant is novel and unsuppcrted
by authority from other jUlisdictions.

In Saladino v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), a bail agent
sought to recover, pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a $4,000 fee paid to a licensed investigator

tl)
to apprehend and surrender the principal to custody. 39 A.D.2d at 765. The principal failed to

-

.•

appear at two court dates, thus the bail agent hired an investigator to locate him. Id. The COUlt
held that under the broad language of the indemnity agreement, the bail
baiJ agent was entitled to

sllch expemes
recover expenses incurred in recapturing and surrendering the principal, provided such

ld. However, because the principal was
are the fair and reasonable value of services rendered. 9 Id.
residing with his wife without any attempt at concealment and working at his regular employment,

ld. As such, the court granted a new trial to
a $4,000 investigator fee was unreasonable. Id.
Saladillo coul1
determine the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered. ld.
Id. The Saladil/o
'.

provided:

cllstomary
While it may be that large contingent fee retainers are customary
and are necessary in many cases to obtain effective results, there is
no apparent reason why a surety should not first mount a more
modest, superficial investigation such as would have been adequate
to locate the principal herein.

-

•

Similar to Idaho Code § 41-1042, N.Y. Insurance Law § 6804, which sets forth the
permissible premium or compensation for a bail bond, is silent as to reimbursement pursuant to
indemnity agreements.
9<)
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Under the broad language of the indemnity agreement executed by
[third party signor]'
signor], [the bail agent] is entitled to reimbursement for
expenses in connection with the apprehension of the principal.
Id. (emphasis added).
In fact, it is a common practice throughout the United States for bail agents to utilize
indemnity agreements to contract for reimbursement of expenses in the event of a breach by tile
criminal defendant. See, e.g. Hernandez v. USA Bail Bonds, 1999 WL 740441 (Tex. Ct. App.

•

1999) (unpublished) (affirming settlement between bail bond company and third party

-

indemnitors who "executed contracts to indemnify in which they agreed to act as sureties for Ibai I
amount], plus all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in apprehending [principal] in the

•

BOllds, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1229,
event [prinicipal] forfeited his bond"); Campbell v. AAA Bail Bonds.

•

(Ind.App.2008) (unpublished) (finding AAA acted as authorized agent when
2008 WL 187968, Ond.App.2(08)
executing the indemnity agreement and therefore able to recover under the agreement for

•

•

cost~;,

expenses and fees incuned by AAA in returning defendant to custody); and
und Calamita v. DePonte,
20,187 A. 129 (1936) (action arising out of indemnity agreement where
122 Conn. 20.187

defendant~;
defendant~;

agreed to indemnify bail bond sureties for damages and costs incurred by sureties because of

•

accused's
accLlsed's default).

Many states also have codified the foregoing practice. See., e.g. Nevada (N.R.S.
697.300(5) providing for reimbursement or right of action "against the principal or any
indemnitor, for actual expenses incurred in good faith, by reason of breach by the defendant of any

.-

of the terms of the written agreement under which and pursuant to which the undertaking of b::il

<.

or bail bond was written"); Utah (U.C.A.
(UC.A. 1953 31A-35-608 providing bail bond businesses the

.

right to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred by the bail bond surety in good faith by

.
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-

-

reason of breach by the defendant of the bail bond agreement); Missouri (V.A.M.S. 374.719
providing bai I bond agents with the authority to use collateral to reimburse costs in case of failure
to appear for reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred); Delaware (18 Del.e. Section 43n,

•

DE ST TI Section 18 Sectiion 4347 providing surety insurance contracts for bail bond agents tJ

-

reimburse the bail agent personally, or permit the bail agent to have a right of action against the

-

defendant or any indemnitor, for actual expenses incurred in good faith, by reason of breach by the
(l0 CCR Section 2081
defendant of any of the terms of the written agreement); California (10

-

expenses incurred
incuned and caused by a breach by the arrestee
anestee of any of the terms of the written

•

agreement under which and pursuant to which the undertaking of bailor the bail bond was

•

providing bail licensee the right to reimburse himself for actual reasonable and necessary

de:lLlct
written); and Arkansas CAR
(AR ADC 166.00.001-23 provides bail bond businesses the right to de:luct
from the collateral reasonable expenses incull"ed
incun-ed due to a breach of the bail bond contract).

•

•

In fact.
facL the undersigned has been unable to locate authority from other jurisdictions which

forbid a bail agent from entering into indemnity agreements at the time of the bai I transaction
which permit recovery of this contingent loss. The DOl's interpretation of an Idaho statute as

•

forbidding this is novel and altogether inconsistent with the statutory, regulatory and case

la\V~

of

other.i urisdictions throughout the United States.
The public policy underlying bail bonds and encouraging the return of fugitives to custJdy,
existing Idaho case law, the legislative history of Idaho Code § 41-1042 and overwhelming
authority from other states all establish that bail agents are entitled to contract for the fair and

...

reasonable value of costs incurred in connection with apprehending and surrendering a principl1
principll

•
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•

to the court's custody. Recognizing bail agents' ability to recover such costs furthers the pub ic
policy underlying bail bonds by promoting a criminal defendant's appearance in court.
B. Substantial Rights of Aladdin Are Prejudiced By the DOr's Declaratory Ruling
Substantial rights of Aladdin have been prejudiced by the declaratory ruling of the DCI.
See Idaho Code § 67 -5279(4) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this

section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced.") The declaratory ruling reflected in the DOl's Final Order was issued in

respons,~

to

the request for declaratory ruling sought by Aladdin. R 109 (Final Order); R 1 (Aladdin's request
for declaratory ruling). This declaratory ruling specifically concerns the Indemnity Agreement for

•

•

Surety Bail Bond utilized by Aladdin to transact business and forbids Aladdin "from entering into
indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the Indemnity
Agreement, Exhibit A to the December 10,2009,
lO, 2009, letter request for declaratory ruling,

•

.•

...."" R 109, 121 (Final Order); R 11-13
contemporaneous with the bail transaction ....

(lndemnit~'
(lndemnit~'

Agreement). Aladdin is financially harmed by this declaratory ruling which prohibits Aladdin
from seeking reimbursement of apprehension costs it incurs in apprehending a criminal defendant

•

COllrt as required pursuant to the terms of its Indemnity Agreement
who has failed to appear illl court

executed at the time of the bail transaction .. Thus, Aladdin's substantial rights are prejudiced by
this declaratory ruling.

,-

V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Final Order because the DOl's
declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity
latel
agreement at the time of a bail transaction which permits collection of apprehension costs latet

'.

27

•
000089

-

-

-

.

..
..

incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required is unreasonable and prejudices
Aladdin's substantial rights.
It,QI(
It.~

Respectfully submitted this
Respectful1y

~ day of December, 2010.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT:"'LP

By

~-zr~--Scott McKay

:>

•
•
•

..
•

••

.
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•
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

•

A. Nature of the Case.

-

The Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance entered his Final Order on August 20,

••

•

..
..

2010, stating therein that a bail agent or surety is precluded from entering into indemnity
agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the Indemnity Agreement,
attached as Exhibit A to Two linn's letter of December 20, 2009 [R., p. 12], contemporaneous
with the bail transaction in accordance with Idaho Code § 41-1042. R., p. 121. The Petitioler
on appeal seeks reversal of the Director's Final Order and asks this Court to find that section ,n
,n1042, Idaho Code, permits bail agents and their surety to enter into indemnity agreements at the
same time as the bail transaction. For the reasons set forth below, the Department asks that the

•

.•
•

-

-

-

Director's Final Order be affirmed in its entirety.
Hi:~tory .
B. Procedural Hi:~tory.

The Respondent agrees with the Procedural History of this case as stated in Petitioner's
Opening Brief, pp. 1-2.
C. Statement of Facts.

The Respondent does not contest the Findings of Fact as stated in the Hearing Officer's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order dated April 1, 2010, or in 1he
60Director's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling. R., pp. 60
71, and 110-112.

•

•
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III. ARGUMENT

•

•

..

•

•

A. The Focus of the Inquiry Is the Interpretation of Idaho Code § 41-1042.
Section 41-1042, Idaho Code reads as follows:
41-1042. COLLECTIONS AND CHARGES PERMITTED. (1) Notwithstanding
any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent in any bail transaction shall not,
directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration
from any person except for the following:
(a)

To pay premiums at the rates established by the insurer;

(b)

To provide collateral;

(c)

To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection with
the bail transaction, limited to the following:
(i)

Expenditures actually and reasonably incurred to verify
underwriting information or to pay for notary public fees,
recording fees, or necessary long distance telephone or telegram
fees:; provided however, that the total of all such expenditures
reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and

(ii)

Travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a
bail agent's place of business, which includes any city or locality
in which the bail agent advertises or engages in bail business, up to
the amount allowed by the internal revenue service for business
travel for the year in which the travel occurs.

.•

•

•

-

-

-

-

(2) Except as pennitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any charge
for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document all
expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement.
Idaho Code § 41-1042 (underscore here).
When interpreting a section of the Idaho Code, this Court:
exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. . .. Where
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. . .. The

•

•
•

Pag<: 2
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..
•

-

language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning....
meaning ....
If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to
resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. . .. When this
Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the
legislative intent and give effect to that intent. ... To ascertain the intent of the
legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the
context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative
history....
history .... It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which
will not render it a nullity. . .. Constructions of a statute that would lead to an
absurd result are disfavored
....
disfavored....

-

36191(IDCCR))
State v. Beavers, -- Idaho --, -- P.3d --, (Ct.App. December 8, 2010) (36183, 36191(1DCCR))
(citations omitted).

•

_

•

.
•

The Department believes that section 41-1042 is plain and unambiguous: in any tail
transaction, a bail agent may not directly or indirectly charge or collect money or any other
consideration except to pay set premiums, provide collateral, and reimburse for enumeraled
expenses set out in the statute. Section 41-1042(1). The bail agent's charges for his service are
limited to section 41-1042. Section 41-1042(2).

•
•

B. The "Bail Transaction" Includes the Indemnity Agreement "Third Paragraph."
1he
At the core of this controversy is the indemnity agreement that is embedded in 1he

Petitioner's and Surety Danielson National Insurance Company's bail form identified as "Exhibit
A," attached in Petitioner's letter of December 10, 2009.

-

-

..•

-

..•

the
R., p. 12. It is identified by 1he

Petitioner as the "Third Paragraph" and reads as follows:
THIRD: To reimburse Second Party [Petitioner] and Surety for actual expenses
incurred and caused by a breach of the Principal of any of the terms for which the
application and Bail Bond were written, including all expenses or liabilities
incurred as a result of searching for, recapturing or returning Principal to custody,
incurred by Second Party or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or
endeavoring to apprehend Principal, including legal fees incurred by Second Party
or Surety in making application to a court for an order to vacate or to set aside the

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Pag/;
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•

•

order of forfeiture of Judgment thereon. However, no expenses or liabilities
incurred for recapturing or returning Principal to custody shall be chargeable after
the entry of Judgment.

•

R., p. 12 (hereinafter "Third Paragraph").

•

indemnitor shall pay for all of Petitioner's expenses or liabilities incurred for searchi 19,

•
•

•
•

•

..
•

-

-

-

-

In sum, the Third Paragraph provides that the

recapturing or returning the principal to authorities. In other words, the Petitioner is seek ng
reimbursement from an indemnitor for expenses related to apprehension of a principal tlat
breaches the bail agreement by escaping bail.
The Petitioner maintains that the Third Paragraph is not a part of the bail transaction; end
further argues that the anticipated reimbursement of apprehension costs relates to

conting'~nt
contingl~nt

costs "unrelated to charges incurred during the bail transaction." Petitioner's Opening Brief pp.
7, 9.

In the words of the Petitioner, the Third Paragraph "provides for reimbursement of

expenses in the event the principal, or defendant, breaches his obligations and fails to appear in
court." Petitioner's Opening Brief, p. 9. The Petitioner claims that the Third Paragraph, a:; a
contingent remedy providing relief in the event the bail agreement is breached, is not a part of
the original bail transaction.
C. The Third Paragraph Is a Part of the "Bail Transaction."

The Respondent believes the Petitioner's Third Paragraph is part of the "bail transaction"
as used in section 41-1042. Before examining this issue further, the parties to the bail bond
agreement should be first identified and a few definitions of terms provided.
In the bail agreement provided by the Petitioner, the parties include the "First Part;',"
which is any indemnitor that executes the agreement. The "Second Party" is the bail bond agent

•

•

-
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•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•

-

-

-

-

sIgmng for himself or on behalf of a bail company, and the "surety" is the carner.

The

"Principal" is the person being bonded and ultimately released from jail, i.e., the defendant. R.,
p.12.
According to title 41, Idaho Code, the term "bail" means a "monetary amount required by
the court to release the de£endant from custody and to ensure his appearance in court as orderd."
Idaho Code § 41-1038(1). The term "bail bond" means a "financial guarantee, posted by a t,ail
t'ail
agent and underwritten by a surety insurance company, that the defendant will appear as
ordered." Idaho Code § 41-1038(3).
The term "bail bond agreement" is defined as a "suretyship contract between the state on
one side and an accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantc!es
guarant(~es
accused....
the appearance of an accused
.... The extent of the surety's undertaking is determined by lhe
bond agreement and is subject to the rules of contract law and suretyship." State v. Castro, 145
Idaho 993, 995, 188 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct.App. 2008).
Section 41-1042 uses the term "bail transaction" three times. The term "transaction" is
defined as "an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements having some connection with each
other, in which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such
persons between themselves are altered. It is a broader term than 'contract.'"

Black's

L7W

Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 1341 (1979).

The Third Paragraph is a part of the "bail transaction" not only because it is embedded
into the bail bond agreement but because it provides a remedy in the event of a breach of the bail

•

•

•
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•
•

•

•
•

•
•

bond agreement. The bail bond agreement is a key part of the overall transaction between the
parties. R., p. 12.
In addition, the Third Paragraph is woven into the terms of the bail transaction. For
example, the Tenth 1 Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement provides that the contractual
obligations of the principal (defendant) and any indemnitor are "joint and several," which
includes the terms set out in the Third Paragraph. R., p. 12. The Tenth Paragraph also pemlits
the Second Party or surety to proceed against any indemnitor without first seeking remedy from
the principal (defendant). R., p. 12. The terms, obligations and waivers set out in the Tenth
Paragraph include the rights and obligations set out in the Third Paragraph.
Another reason the Third Paragraph is a part of the bail transaction is that the Petitioner
Two Jinn, Inc., considers it as a contractual remedy or a "promise to pay as in the event of a
breach." Tr. Vol. 1,2 p. 26, LL. 8-10; p. 29, LL. 17-18.

The Petitioner requires that the Third

Paragraph be a term of the contract before it will provide bail. Petitioner's Opening Brief, p.

:~O;

see also, Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 24-25. Further, the Eighth Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement
provides that any money or other property deposited with the Petitioner may be levied against to
cover any "hereinabove obligations, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and expenses."

-

•
•
•

This

"TENTH: The obligations hereunder are joint and several and any amounts due shall bear interest at :he
proc(:ed
maximum rate of interest allowed by law. The Second Party and the Surety shall not be first obliged to procl:ed
against the Principal on Bail Bond before having recourse against the First Party or anyone of them, the First Party
hereby expressly waiving the benefits of law requiring the Second Party or the Surety to make claim upon or to
proceed or enforce its remedies against the Principal before making demand upon or proceeding and/or enforcing its
remedies against anyone or more of the First Party." R., p. 12.
2
The reference to "Vol. I" in this Brief is to the hearing transcript of the Hearing held on March 8, 2010,
before Hearing Officer Jean R. Uranga, Esq. The reference to "Vol. II" in this Brief is the hearing transcript of :he
Hearing held on July 21, 2010, before the Director of the Department ofInsurance, William W. Deal.

Pag(: 6
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includes the Third Paragraph and incurred apprehension expenses. See, "EIGHTH," R., p. 12.
(See, Footnote No.5).

In the final analysis, the Third Paragraph is a part of the bail transaction because it is one
of several "acts or agreem(~nts" included in the overall bail transaction.
D. As Part of the Bail Transaction, the Third Paragraph Is Not a Permitted Charge
or Collection of "Other Valuable Consideration" under Section 41-1042.

Section 41-1042 states that a "bail agent in any bail transaction shall not, directly or
indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration from any person" except for
those enumerated purposes outlined in subsection (1)(a), (b), and (c). Section 41-1042.
"Consideration" is defined as "any act, forbearance, creation, modification or destruct: on
of a legal relationship, or return promise given in exchange. In order to constitute considerati,m,
an act or promise must be bargained for and given in exchange for the promise." Trotzer v. Vig,
203 P.2d 1056, 1061, 149 Wash.App. 594, 606 (Ct.App. 2009). See, also, Pink v. Busch, E91
(" ... a performance or return promise must be bargained for. A
P.2d 456, 100 Nev. 684 (1984) ("...a

•

performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for lis
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise."); and, Sterling Savings BGnk
v. JHM Properties, LLC, 717 F.Supp.2d
F .Supp.2d 1142, 1149 (2010) ("A promisor receives consideration
promisee. ").
if he receives some right, interest, profit, or other benefit from the promisee.").

-

-

In exchange for bail and release of the defendant and assurance to the court of 1he
defendant's appearance, the Petitioner requires the defendant and any indemnitor to sign a bail
bond agreement inclusive of the Third Paragraph. Thereby, the indemnitor agrees to pay actual

•

•

•
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•

apprehension costs in the event of a breach. See, Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, LL. 24-25; and, Petitioner's
Opening Brief, p. 20.
As a promise to the Petitioner from the principal and indemnitor for reimbursement of
apprehension costs in

..
•

th~:

rem~:dy

event of a breach, the Third Paragraph is a contractual

conferred to Two Jinn,
linn, Inc. Thereby, it is valuable consideration given as an element of the bail
agreement entered into between the bail agent, the surety, the principal and the indemnitor.
E. The Third Paragraph Is Valuable Consideration for the Bail Transaction
][fall within One of the Enumerated Exceptions.
and Does Not Ilfall
As noted above, section 41-1042 prohibits charges or collection of money or other
valuable consideration from any person, except for the following: "(a) [t]o pay premiums at:he
rates established by the insurer; (b) [t]o provide collateral; [or] (c) [t]o reimburse the bail

•

..

for actual expenses incuITed in connection with the bail transaction" limited to incidental
expenses not to exceed $50.00 and travel expenses in excess of 25 miles at the IRS
mileage rate. Idaho Code § 41-1042(1).

•

agl~nt

businl~ss
businl~ss

As the Third Paragraph is part of the bail agreement

and the overall bail transaction, does the Third Paragraph fall within any of the exceptions set out
in section 41-1042(1)(a), (b), or (c)?
Clearly, as a contingent promise to pay apprehension costs, the Third Paragraph does 1Iot
involve the payment of premiums as stated in section 41-1042(1)(a)
41-1042(1)( a) and it is not one of 1he

-

41-1042(1)(c).
enumerated exceptions in section 41-1042(1)(
c). However, is the Third Paragraph a form of
"collateral" which is an exception provided by section 41-1042(1 )(b)?

•
•
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The term "collateral" is defined in title 41, Idaho Code, as "property of any kind given as
here)..
security to obtain a bail bond." Idaho Code § 41-1038(4) (underscore here)
The first key term used in the definition of "collateral" is "property."

The term

"property" evidences:
... ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose
of a thing in every Iegal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else
from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition
which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive
right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.

•

1095 .
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 1095.
Property includes "both real and personal property." Idaho Code § 73-114(2)(d).3 "'R,~al
property' is coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments, possessory rights and claim5."
Idaho Code § 73-114(2)(e). "'Personal property' includes money, goods, chattels, things in

..

action, evidences of debt and general intangibles4 as defined in the uniform commercial code secured transactions." Idaho Code § 73-114(2)(c).
Another key term used in section 41-1038 to describe the meaning of "collateral" is 1he
definition of "security." A security or security interest is "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." In re: Wiersma, 382 B.R.

2~14,

305 (2002) (citing section 28-1-201, Idaho Code). See, also, In re: Cybernetic Services, Inc.,252

•

•

3
"The following words have, in the compiled laws, the signification attached to them in this section, unl ~ss
... " IdLho
otherwise apparent from the context: ... (c) 'personal property' ... (d) 'property' ... (e) 'real property' ..."
Code § 73-114(2).
4
As referenced by the foregoing section 73-114, a "general intangible" is defined as: "any personal propelty,

including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documeIlts,
documellts,
goods, instruments, investment property, letter of credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other mineral
02(42) .
before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software." Idaho Code § 28-9-1 02(42).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Pagl: 9

000104

•

..•

F.3d 1039,1044, n. 1 (9 th Cir. 2001) ("A 'security interest' is an interest in personal property that
secures a payment or the performance of an obligation.").
obligation.") .
In the instant matter, the collateral, or property "of any kind" of monies or other

..

valuables deposited with the Petitioner, or other permissive liens against property, are given in
ill a

..•

fiduciary capacity to the Petitioner as security for the bail bond. See, Idaho Code § 41-1043(2).
41-1043(2) .

•

"collateral means property of any kind. Any kind. And [Petitioner] submit[s] that that any kind

However, the Petitioner takes the position that the Third Paragraph is collateral and that

includes a promise to pay. A promise to pay in the event of a breach." Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, LL. 13]3
18.
The Petitioner argues that the Third Paragraph is a promise to pay; therefore it impliedly

•

..•

argues the Third Paragraph is a form of promissory note. However the Petitioner may designate
the Third Paragraph, it is ultimately a contingent promise to pay. A promissory note is an
28·9obligation ... " Idaho Code § 28·9
"instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation..."
102(65). "A 'promissory note' is itself merely a 'promise or engagement, in writing, to pay a
specified sum at a time the:rein limited ... to a person therein named, or to his order, or bearer.'"
In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1347 (9 th Cir.1983) (quoting, Black's Law
Dictionary, p. 1093 (5th ed. 1979). "A promissory note is merely a promise to pay-it is not

-

..•

•

..

security." Washington State Department of Revenue

v.

Security Pacific Bank of Washington,

NA., 109 Wash.App. 795, 808, 38 P.3d 354, 360 (2002). "A promissory note must not depelld

rl.
upon any contingency whatever." Henry Miller v. David Austen, et ai, 54 U.S. 218, 221 (185 ri.
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The Third Paragraph provides Two linn, Inc., a remedy in the event of a breach of
contract: recourse to the indemnitor or defendant to reimburse the Petitioner for apprehenson

•

costs. Therefore, the Third Paragraph is not "property" and does not fall under the exception for

..

collateral at section 41-1042(1 )(b) as a permitted charge in a bail transaction.

•
•

Even if it could be found to be a form of "property of any kind" within the meaning of
section 41-1038, the Third Paragraph is not property given as security for a bail bond. In ober
words, in and of itself the Third Paragraph does not provide recourse to a secured interest in
personal property that provides payment for apprehension costs.
If, for the sake of argument, the Third Paragraph was considered collateral and permit.ed
to be included in the Indemnity Agreement under section 41-1042, it would create an excess ve
collateral (and in some circumstances a type of double collateral).

In many circumstances
circumstan(:es

involving the Petitioner, the indemnitor may deposit with the bail bond company cash or other
types of property as collateral to secure the bail bond and deposit with the bail bond company lhe

•

executed Indemnity Agreement inclusive of the Third Paragraph. If, as Petitioner claims, lhe
Third Paragraph is collateral to secure the company's reimbursement of apprehension costs, lhe
deposit of cash or other property and the signed Indemnity Agreement inclusive of the Third

-

Paragraph would constitute excessive collateral that exceeds the amount of bail and therefore
violates section 41-1043(1).
F. The Third Paragraph as a Remedy.

In addition to claiming that the Third Paragraph is collateral to secure the costs of
apprehension, the Petitioner also characterizes it as a form of remedy in the contingent event of a

.
.
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•

breach. For example, see, Petitioner's Opening Brief, pp. 6, 8, 9,12,14,17, and 20; Tr. Vol. I,

25,12, I. 1; p. 12, LL. 19-22; p. 14, LL. p. 26, LL. 8-10; p. 29, LL. 13-18; and Tr. vol.
pp. 11, L. 25,12,1.
II, p. 11, LL. 9, 18-19; p. 12, LL. 3-4; p. 13, LL. 23-25, p. 14, LL. 1-2, 15-16.

•

The Department agrees with the position that the Third Paragraph provides a contractual

.

remedy in the event of a breach of the bail agreement.

..

other collateral deposited with the bail bond company to secure reimbursement of apprehenson

.
.

The Third Paragraph provides a remedy and recourse directly to the indemnitor or to

costs, but it is not itself the security. Under the Indemnity Agreement's Eighth 5 Paragraph, :he
Petitioner has recourse to any security (i.e., cash or other permissive lien) deposited with the tail

agent if the bail bond agreement is breached. In the event there is no cash or other type of Len
deposited with Petitioner, under the Third Paragraph, the Petitioner's recourse is directly to ':he
-:he

.

agreement .
defendant or any indemnitor that signed the bail bond agreement.
" ... speedy [judicial] remedy afforded for
Idaho's Constitution provides for a "...

ev(~ry

injury of person, property, or character ... [.]"
[.J" Idaho Const. art. I, § 18. An instructive definition
of "remedy" is found in Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code, which is defined as "any remedial
right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal." Idaho

-

-

•

•

§

Eighth:' in addition to bail amounts or premium unpaid, in the e\ ent
According to the Indemnity Agreement at "Paragraph Eighth."
the Indemnity Agreement is breached, Two linn, Inc., has recourse against any monies or other property deposited to secure the
bail bond, to cover apprehension costs incurred returning the defendant to the court, as follows:
"That all money or other property which the First Party has deposited or may deposit with the Second Party
[Two linn, Inc.] or the Surety may be applied as collateral security or indemnity for matters contained herein,
and to accomplish the purposes contained herein, the Second Party [Two linn, Inc.] is authorized to lawfully
levy upon said collateral in the manner provided by law and to apply the proceeds therefrom and any and all
money deposited to payment or reimbursement for the hereinabove obligations, liabilities, losses, costs.
damages and expenses."

•

Cod(~

R., p. 12.
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-

after resorting to the law."" Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F3d 111, 148 (2 nd Cir.

•

2010) (italics in original)(quoting Remedies, Edward D. Re & Joseph R. Re (6 th Ed. 200:i)).

_

Black's Law Dictionary defines remedy as: "[t]he rights given to a party by law or by contnct

•
•

•

28-1-201 (34).

The term "remedy" can also "refer to 'precisely what the plaintiff may reco'fer

which that party may exercise upon a default by the other contracting party, or upon:he
commission ofa wrong (a tort) by another party." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 1163.
As the above definitions reveal, a remedy provides a ready relief that is contingent uron
an event such as a breach of contract or other untoward event that results in injury to the person,
property, or character of a person. In the instant matter, the Third Paragraph provides a remedy

..

to Two Jinn, Inc. In the event of a breach, i.e., the defendant escapes bail, the Third Paragraph

.

provides that Two Jinn, Inc., and/or the surety will be reimbursed for apprehension costs. In 1he
event the defendant or other indemnitor gave property as security for the bail bond, in

•

•

-

-

-

accordance with the Indemnity Agreement's Eighth Paragraph, the monies or other propeiy
posted to secure the bail bond may be used to secure and pay the costs of apprehension.
In sum, the Third Paragraph provides the bail bond company a remedy in the event of
breach; however, section 41-1042, Idaho Code, prohibits the Petitioner from including the Thi rd
Paragraph in the Indemnity Agreement because it is a charge of other valuable consideration that
does not meet any of the exceptions in subsections (a), (b), or (c) of section 41-1042(1).

•
•

•
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-

IV. CONCLUSION

The Respondent respectfully requests that the Court affinn the Director of the Idaho

•

Department of Insurance's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order dated August 20, 2010,

•

finding that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes a bail agent or surety from entering into indemnity
agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs contemporaneous with the hail

•

transaction or from requiring any party to enter into such an indemnity agreement in ordel to

•

maintain the validity of a bail bond.

..
•
•

RESPECTFULL Y submitted this 30 th day of December, 2010.
2010.
RESPECTFULLY
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

~~-~

~.
Deputy Attorney General

..•
-

.•
•

.•
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have, on this ~ day of December 2010, caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following by the designated
means:

•
•

.M:tf-
.M:ti--

Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

IZI first class mail

D certified mail
D hand delivery
D via facsimile

..
•

..
.

•

.
•

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 15

000110

A.M·'--JA-N-2-l;~~
A.M·--JA-N-2-';M;~

•

CHRISTOPHER D. HlCH, Clerk
By LARA AME:S
OEPUTY

•

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

•

•

•
•
•

In the Matter of:
TWO JINN, INC.'s
Request for Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

•

Case No. CV-OC-201O-17486
CV-OC-201O-l7486

-------------- )
----------------------------)
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds;
Petitioner,

•

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDAHO DEP
ARTMEl'rT OF INSURANCE)
DEPARTMEl'rT
)
)
Respondent.
)

•
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

•
•

Petition for Judicial Review from
Idaho Department of Insurance
Director's Findings, Conclusions and Final Order

•

William Deal, Director

•
•

•

•

Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

I -1042 Prohibits Aladdin From Entering Into ,In
A. The DOl's Declaration that Idaho Code § 4 I-1042
Indemnity Agreement at the Time of the Bail Transaction Which Permits Collection of
Apprehension Costs Should a Defendant Fail to Appear in Court is Unreasonable
Section 41-1042 limits charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. The
Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defendam
and/or a third party guarantor) to reimburse the bail agent or surety for expenses that might ar se

•

•

following the bail transaction in the event the criminal defendant breaches the bail bond
agreement by failing to appear in court as ordered. Thus, the Indemnity Agreement does not
describe charges for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction and instead, as acknowledged

•
•

4lby the Respondent, sets forth the remedies available in the event of breach. Indeed, Section 4l
1042 expressly permits bail agents to collect collateral to secure the bail bond, which necessarily
contemplates that the parties will enter into a contract describing remedies in the event of a
breach of the bail bond agreement.

•

Because the Indemnity Agreement does not describe the bail agent's charges for his or her
service in the bail transaction, Section 41-1042 does not govern that agreement. To conclude

'.

otherwise would not only be contrary to the statute's express terms, it would thwart the purpme
of bail and create significant public safety concerns by discouraging bail agents from

capturin!~

fugitives and returning them to the court. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the DOl's
Declaration that Section 41-1042 precludes a contract providing for reimbursement of
apprehension expenses in the event of breach and declare that Section 41- 1042 does not prech.;de
the Indemnity Agreement.

I.
•

•

000114

-

.......

•

-

1.

-

The Respondent's Brief is largely devoted to its argument that the Indemnity Agreement

The Third Paragraph does not describe charges for the bail agent's service in tlle
tile
bail transaction

-

yet not enumerated in Section 41-1042. Section 41-1042 only applies to agreements that set brth

-•

a "charge" or "money or other valuable consideration" for the bail agent's "service in a bail

•

•

is part of the bail transaction. This is irrelevant. Many agreements are part of the bail transaction

transaction." The Indemnity Agreement neither constitutes valuable consideration for the bail
agent's service in the bail transaction nor describes charges for that service. As such, Section 41
41-

•

•

1042 does not apply to the Indemnity Agreement and the DOl erred in concluding otherwise.
The Respondent broadly defines "valuable consideration" and then urges that because the
agreement to reimburse apprehension costs fits that definition and is not enumerated, it is

•
•

precluded. Respondent's Briefpg. 7. However, bail agents require the defendant to agree to <Iny
number of conditions that fit this sweeping definition of valuable consideration, including the
agreement to appear in court, to be monitored, to submit to supervised bail, to provide a third

•

•

-

party guarantor and to reimburse the bail agent or surety for the amount of any forfeiture.
The DOl agrees such agreements are appropriate and not precluded by Section 41-1 04:~
notwithstanding the fact that they are not enumerated therein. See R 111-112 (Final Order, pp, 3320 I0 Tr. p. 18, In. 9-22; p. 20, In. 22-24. Moreover, by permitting bail agents to
4); March 8, 2010
"collect money or other valuable consideration" to "provide collateral," Section 41-1042
expressly contemplates that bail agents will contract for remedies in the event of a breach oftte

•

criminal defendant's obligations under the bail bond. See I.C. § 41-1042(1 )(b).
As Aladdin has repeatedly noted to the DOl and this Court, the Respondent's position

•
2

•
•
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-

..
-

that Section 41-1042 precludes agreements concerning recovery of apprehension costs but
fOJ the
permits similar non enumerated agreements including the agreement to reimburse Aladdin fOl
forfeited bond is entirely inconsistent. See R. 7,60,97; Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's

•

Motion to Stay Final Agency Order, pg. 5-6; Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's

..

Motion to Stay Final Agency Order, pg. 4. Nevertheless, in its brief, the Respondent again fa Is
to explain how a promise to pay apprehension costs in the event of a breach constitutes "valmlble

•
•

consideration" prohibited by the statute while the promise to pay the face amount of the bond in
the event of breach does not.
The Respondent's inconsistent position is possibly explained by its confusion of the

•
•

parties to the bail bond itself with the indemnity agreement between the bail agent, surety and
defendant. The Respondent correctly notes that the bail bond is a suretyship contract between the
state on one side and the defendant and his or her surety on the other. Respondent's Briefpg. 5.

•
•

Pursuant to this contract, the surety guarantees the appearance of an accused. State v.

Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116, 952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998). Neither
Aladdin nor any third party guarantor are a party to the bail bond and neither the defendant no r a

•

-

-

-

third party are obligated to reimburse the surety or the state in the event the defendant fails to

appear. Conversely, the State ofIdaho is not a party to the Indemnity Agreement between the
surety, bail agent, defendant and any third party.
Despite correctly identifying the parties to the Indemnity Agreement, the Respondent
refers to that agreement as part of the "bail bond agreement." See Respondent's Briefpg. 5-7.
The only term set forth in the bail bond agreement is that the surety - in Aladdin's case
Danielson National Insurance - will pay the State of Idaho if the defendant does not appear in

3

•

•
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-

-

court as ordered. Aladdin requires that defendants enter the Indemnity Agreement, including its
requirement that the defendant reimburse Aladdin or its surety for any forfeiture, to secure th(:

-

surety's undertaking pursuant to the bail bond agreement and to protect against loss if the

•

defendant breaches his obligations.

-

in the bail transaction includes tasks such as gathering information concerning a criminal

•

defendant's background, ties to the community, family ties, criminal history, credit history, the

•

Unlike the breach remedies described in the Indemnity Agreement, a bail agent's service

financial wherewithal of all those involved as well as other relevant factors in evaluating the risk
posed by executing a particular bond. For their part, the consumer is required to pay the

•
•

premium and to reimburse the bail agent for certain delineated expenses. Locating and
apprehending a defendant who later absconds, which neither Aladdin nor its surety is legally
obligated to do under the bail bond, is not part of the bail agent's "service in a bail transaction."

•
•

The Indemnity Agreement constitutes neither a charge nor valuable consideration for the
bail agent's service in the bail transaction within the meaning of Section 41-1042. Therefore, the
DOl erred in concluding that Section 41-1042 precludes recovery of apprehension expenses

•

-

-

a~:

set forth in the Indemnity Agreement.

2.

If the Third Paragraph is construed as "valuable consideration" charged in a ba 1I
transaction, then it must be considered as a form of collateral

To the extent that the contingent agreement described in the Third Paragraph is "valuable
consideration" charged in a bail transaction, it is a form of collateral expressly permitted by
Idaho Code § 41-1042(1 )(b). In response to this argument, the Respondent asserts that the
Indemnity Agreement is not property of "any kind" within the meaning of Idaho Code §

•
4

•

•
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•

-.
•

.
.

41-1038(2) and that the agreement is given to secure apprehension costs rather than the bond.
Respondent's Briefpg. 11. Initially, contrary to the Respondent's characterization, Aladdin dJes
not contend that the Indemnity Agreement is intended to secure the reimbursement of
apprehension costs. Rather, the agreement secures the surety's undertaking in agreeing to pay the
face amount of the bond to the state by providing recourse for the expenses it incurs in the event
the defendant fails to appear and the bond is forfeited. I
The Respondent also argues that as a promise to pay, the Indemnity Agreement is not
"property of any kind." After noting that a promise to pay does not fit the general definition of

..

either real or personal property, the Respondent devotes almost a page in response to what it

•

Respondent's Brief pg. 10. Aladdin has not contended that the Indemnity Agreement is a

.

promissory note and, indeed, has consistently described the agreement as the agreement to pay

..
•

characterizes as Aladdin's implicit argument that the Indemnity Agreement is a promissary note.

expenses only in the event of a contingency - the defendant's breach of his or her obligations.
As the Respondent concedes at pages 12 and 13 of its brief, the Indemnity Agreement is a
,event of a breach. That agreement is given as security to obtain a be.il
contractual remedy in the levent
bond and to guarantee the validity of the principal's promise to appear as ordered by the court
Even if the Indemnity Agreement is not the type of property that is normally

-

-

-

contemplated as collateral, it is given to secure the bail bond and, thus, more closely resemble; a

Thus, the DOl is incorrect in its contention that if the Indemnity Agreement is constmed
as collateral, it would constitute "double" or "excessive" collateral because the agreement
secures apprehension costs in addition to the bail bond. Respondent's Briefpg. 11. Moreover,
Aladdin agrees that apprehension costs must be reasonable and cannot be excessive in relation to
the face amount of the bond. See I.e. §41-1043(1).
I

•
5

•
•
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-

..•

-

fonn of collateral than a charge for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. Therefore, if
the Third Paragraph is construed as "valuable consideration" charged in a bail transaction, then it
must be considered as a fonn of collateral.
3.
3.

Summary

The plain tenns ofIdaho Code § 41-1042 clearly and unambiguously apply to charges

•

..•
•

assessed for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. The Indemnity Agreement does not
set forth charges assessed for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction and, instead, provldes
for reimbursement of expenses in the event a contingency occurs - that is the criminal defend;mt
breaches the tenns for which the bail bond was written by failing to appear in court. By

•

•

expressly pennitting bail agents to collect collateral, the legislature further affinned its intent:o
pennit bail agents to contract for their remedies in the event of a breach.
Moreover, as described in Aladdin's opening brief, legislative history and public policy

•

•

confinn a legislative intent to allow bail agents to contract for the recovery of contingent loss{:s,
including apprehension expenses, at the time of the bail transaction. The primary purpose of hail
is to ensure the presence of the accused to answer criminal charges. State v. Quick Release Bdl

•

Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788,792 (Ct. App. 2007). This purpose is served by

providing the surety a financial incentive to locate fugitives and return them to the court. If
pennitted to collect the amount of the forfeiture but not its expenses in re-capturing the
defendant, the bail agent has a financial incentive to let the forfeiture stand and collect from the
indemnitor. Thus, rather than further the purpose of bail and the significant public safety issues

-

associated therewith, the DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 actively thwarts that purpose
and compromises the public safety. Recognizing bail agents' ability to recover such costs

•
6

•
•
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-

furthers the public policy underlying bail bonds by promoting a criminal defendant's appearance

-

in court.

-•

consideration for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. Accordingly, Section 41-1042

.•

does not apply to such agreements and the DOl erred in declaring that the Indemnity Agreemmt

The Indemnity Agreement does not set forth charges, money or other valuable

utilized by Aladdin may not require indemnitors to reimburse it or its surety for expenses

•
tI

incurred in re-capturing the defendant and returning him or her to custody.
III. CONCLUSION
As set forth above and in Aladdin's Opening Brief, this Court should reverse the Final

•
•

Order because the DO I' s declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 precludes Aladdin from entering
into an indemnity agreemtmt at the time of a bail transaction which permits collection of
apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear as required is

•
•

•

unreasonable and prejudices Aladdin's substantial rights.
Respectfully submitted this 20 th day of January, 2011.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
l,LP

~
.... ~~;
~~~~;

By

Scott McKay

_

•
7

•
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COUNT'lCtmlSt091dER D. RICH, Clerk
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT\CtmlStmiER
By NICOL T't'LER
DEPUT'·
DEPUT\·

TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,

Petitioner,
vs.
IDAHO DEPT. OF INSlJRANCE,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2010-17486

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE: PETITION
SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW

--------------)
This case is before the Court on petition for judicial review of declaratory ruling of the
Idaho Department of Insurance. For the reasons that follow, the decision will be affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner, Two Jinn, Inc. (Two Jinn), a bail bond company, sought a declaratc1ry ruling
from the respondent, the Idaho Department of Insurance (the Department), that I.C. § 41-1042
does not prevent a bail agent or its surety "from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time
cCilllection
of a bail transaction which permits the recovery of actual expenses later incurred in CCilllection
with the apprehension and surrender ofa criminal defendant as a result of that criminal de:endant's
failure to appear in court as required." Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 1 (citing Administrative
Record (hereinafter R.), at I).
The following facts are essentially undisputed:
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Petitioner Two Jinn does business in the State of Idaho as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds. Two Jinn is licensed by the State of Idaho as a producer of
bail surety insurance. Danielson National Insurance Company is authorized as an
insurer by the State of Idaho and Danielson's authorized lines of insurance
include surety insurance. Aladdin utilizes bail bonds issued by Danielson in
connection with its pretrial release and to that end, uses a form entitled 'Indemnity
Agreement for Surety Bail Bond.' R. 11-13, 70, 111. The Third Paragraph of thi~
Indemnity Agreement requires the parties:
THIRD: To reimburse Aladdin for actual expenses incurred
and caused by a breach by the Principal of the terms for
which the Application and Bail Bond were written, including
all expenses or liabilities incurred as a result of searching for,
recapturing or returning Principal to custody, incurred by
Aladdin or Surety or as necessary in apprehending or
endeavoring to apprehend Principal, including legal fees
incurred by Aladdin or Surety in making application to a
court for an order to vacate or to set aside the order of
forfeiture or Judgment entered thereon. However, no
expenses or liabilities incurred for recapturing or returning
Principal to custody shall be chargeable after the entry of
Judgment.
If an individual is arrested for an alleged criminal offense, the individual can be
released from actual custody upon posting bail. R. 70 (citing I.e. § 19-2906). Bail
may be posted by filing a bail bond, a property bond, or a cash deposit. R. 70
(citing I.e. § 19-2907(1) and I.e.R. 46(f)(1)). If a bail bond is posted and the
criminal defendant fails to appear for court as ordered, the court will order the bail
forfeited. R. 70 (citing I.e. § 2915). Idaho Code § 19-2914 empowers the surety
insurance company or its bail agent to arrest the criminal defendant anytime
before the bail has been exonerated. R. 70-71 (citing I.e. § 19-2914). The
forfeiture of the bail is exonerated if the criminal defendant is brought before the
court within 180 days following the order forfeiting the bail. R. 71 (citing I.e. §
19-2922(5)).
The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity Agreement allows Aladdin and Danielson
to recover costs expended by them in apprehending and returning a criminal
defendant to custody who has failed to appear in court as required. R. 71. The
declaratory ruling issued by the DOl interpreting Idaho Code § 41-1042 prohibits
Aladdin from utilizing its Indemnity Agreement during the bail transaction for
this purpose. The Final Order specifically holds:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that a bail
agent or surety is precluded by Idaho Code § 41-1042 from entering into
indemnity agreements for the reimbursement of apprehension costs, such as the
Indemnity Agreement, Exhibit A to the December 10, 2009, letter request for
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declaratory ruling, contemporaneous with the bail transaction, i.e. the writing of
the bail bond" or from requiring any party to enter into such an indemnity
agreement in order to maintain the validity of the bail bond. R.12l
R.121 Petitioner's
Opening Brief, at 2-4.
The hearing officer assigned to the case ultimately concluded that "I.e. § 41-1042
precludes agreements providing for reimbursement of apprehension and surrender cost:; because
those costs are not expressly delineated as permitted charges for the bail agent's service in a bail
transaction." !d., at 2 (citing R., at 69).
The hearing officer's findings were upheld by the director of the Department and Two Jinn
filed a petition seeking judicial review of this determination.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The procedures concerning judicial review of Idaho state agency determinations are set
forth in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code § 67-5271 et. seq. as noted
hereinafter:
(1) Judicial review of agency action shall be governed by the provisions of this
chapter unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular matter.
(2) A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested
case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with
the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code.
(3) A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an agency
other than the industrial commission or the public utilities commission is entitled
to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements
of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279. I. C. § 67-5270.
In reviewing an agency's decision, the court may not "substitute its judgment for hat of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) Instead,
the court must defer "to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Price v,
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Payette County Bd. o/County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Bennett v.
State, 147 Idaho 141, 142,206 P.3d 505,506 (Ct. App. 2009).
Agency action must be affirmed on appeal unless the court determines that the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion. I.e. § 67-5279(3); Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. The party
attacking the agency's decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency erred in a
manner specified in section 67-6279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price, 131
Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142,206 P.3d at 506.

ANALYSIS

Two Jinn asselis the following issue on appeal: the Department of Insurance's declaration
that I.C. § 41-1042 prohibits it from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time oCthe bail
transaction, which pennits the collection of apprehension costs should a defendant fail to appear in
court, is unreasonable because the Idaho Legislature did not intend to limit a bail agent's Ibility to
recover apprehension costs pursuant to an indemnity agreement.
The relevant statute provides:

I.e. § 41-1042 COLLECTIONS AND CHARGES PERMITTED:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a bail agent in any bail
transaction shall not, directly or indirectly, charge or collect money or other
valuable consideration from any person except for the following:
(a) To pay pr,emiums at the rates established by the insurer;
(b) To provide collateral;
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(c) To reimburse the bail agent for actual expenses incurred in connection with
the bail transaction, limited to the following:
(i) Expenditures actually and reasonably incurred to verify underwriting
information or to pay for notary public fees, recording fees, or necessary long
distance telephone or telegram fees; provided however, that the total of all such
expenditures reimbursed shall not exceed fifty dollars ($50.00); and
(ii) Travel c:xpenses
e:xpenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a bail
agent's place of business, which includes any city or locality in which the bail
agent advertises or engages in bail business, up to the amount allowed by the
internal revenue service for business travel for the year in which the travel occurs.
(2) Except as permitted under this section, a bail agent shall not make any
charge for his service in a bail transaction and the bail agent shall fully document
all expenses for which the bail agent seeks reimbursement.

The agency's factual findings are not at issue, just its statutory interpretation. When an
issue of statutory interpretation is involved, the court generally exercises free review. In Ie Daniel

w., 145 Idaho 677, 679, 183 P.3d 765, 767 (2008).1
(2008).\
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction

IS

that where a statute is plain, clear and

unambiguous, we are constrained to follow that plain meaning and neither add to the st itute
ltute nor
take away by judicial construction." Poison Creek Publishing, Inc. v. Central Idaho Publishing,
Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 429, 3 P.3d 1254, 1257 (et. App. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
"Statutory interpretation always begins with an examination of the literal words of the statute.

l"An agency's interpretation of its enabling statutes is entitled to deference if a four-pronged test is satisfied. First, the
agency must have been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue. Second, the agency's
statutory construction must be reasonable. Third, the court must determine that the statutory language at issue does not
treat the precise issue. Fourth, 1he
def.!rence are
the court must ask whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of def~rence
present (the public group's reliance on the agency's interpretation over a period of time; the agency's inttrpretation
represents a practical interpretation of the statute; the legislature is charged with knowledge of how its satutes are
interpreted and by not altering the statute, it presumably sanctions the agency's interpretation; the agency's
interpretation is entitled to additional weight when it is formulated contemporaneously with the passage of :he statute
at issue; and courts should recognize and defer to the agency's expertise). If the test is met, the court must give
'considerable deference' to the agency's interpretation." Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 313,
208 P.3d 289, 295 (2009). It appears that the test is met here, since the Department of Insurance is entruste:l
entrnste:l with the
responsibility of administering the statute and its statutory construction is reasonable and practical. This wo Llld entitle
the agency's determination to considerable deference.

Memorandum Decision And Order .5

000126

...

Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature means what is clearly
stated in the statute." !d. "We must give the words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, and
there is no occasion for construction where the language of a statute is unambiguous." !d.
"When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the
legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider the rules of statutory
ft!asonable
construction ... A statute is ambiguous when the language is capable of more than one n:asonable
interpretation. However, a statute may not be deemed ambiguous merely because partiEs present
differing interpretations to the court." Farber, 147 Idaho at 310-11, 208 P.3d at 292-93.
This statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous and this Court would uphold the agency's
interpretation of it, even if it was entitled to no deference. The statute provides that a bai l agent in
any bail transaction can collect or charge or receive only the following "from any pelson," (1)
premiums; and (2) reimbursement for actual expenses incurred in connection with the bail
transaction. However" these reimbursement expenses are limited to expenditures for verifying
information, to pay for notary fees, recording fees, long distance or tele§fam
teleuam fees
underwriting infonnation,
(not to exceed $50.00) and travel expenses incurred more than 25 miles away from a bal agent's
place of business (up to the amount allowed by the internal revenue service for business ravel for
the year in which the travel occurs).
These are the only expense reimbursements allowed by the statute. There is Simply no
provision in this statute, which covers "[c]ollections and charges permitted,"
pennitted," for a bail agent to
receive reimbursement for the costs and expenses associated with the recapture of an at scondee,
except in the context of notary fees, recording fees, long distance or telegram fees (not tD exceed
-',
/
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$50.00) and travel expenses incurred more than 25 miles away from the bail agent's place of
business (not to exceed the amount allowed by the IRS for business travel for that year).

2

Two linn argues that the tenns of the statute are not applicable because it only ::.pplies to
"bail transactions" and that seeking recovery of expenses incurred pursuant to a bail contract's
tenns is not a bail transaction. This argument is without merit.
A bail contract is obviously part of a bail transaction. "'Bail' means a monetar:1 amount
required by the court to release the defendant from custody and to ensure his appearance in court
as ordered."

I.e.

§ 41-1038(1). "'Bail bond' means a financial guarantee, posted by a tail agent

and underwritten by a surety insurance company, that the defendant will appear as ordered."

I.e. §

41-1038(3).
"A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one sid;: and an
accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the appearalce of an
agreemeut and is
accused. The extent of the surety's undertaking is detennined by the bond agreemellt
subject to the rules of contract law and suretyship." State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 993, 995, 188 P.3d
(Ct. App. 20(8).
935,937 (et.
2008).
As noted by the Department, a transaction is defined as the "[a]ct of transacting or
conducting any busim$s; negotiation ... It must therefore consist of an act or agreement, or
several acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more :han one
person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between themsdves are
altered. It is a broader tenn than 'contract.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5 th Ed., at 134. (1979).
There is nothing to indicate that Two linn will conduct and conclude a bail transaction wi thout the
2The
2The hearing officer found! that "the clear and unambiguous language states that a bail agent 'shall not, directly or
indirectly, charge or collect money or other valuable consideration from any person' except for the specific allowable
expenses set forth in the statute." Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order, at 7.
Also, "[t]he statute does not authorize a bail agent to recover costs of apprehension and return unless thos ~ expenses
include 'travel expenses incurred more than twenty-five (25) miles from a bail agent's place of business. '" !d.
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bail contract forming a part of that transaction. 3 It is a part of the bail transaction and it i:; covered
by I.e. § 41-1042.
Two Jinn argues that the statute is not applicable to the expenses recovery proviE ion in its
indemnity agreement because it is not receiving a charge or collecting a fee for this,

01

that this

should be considered allowable "collateral." However, the indemnity agreement is a part of the
overall bail transaction, for which Two Jinn is receiving a fee and collecting a charge. Arguably,
the collection of costs of apprehension is a "charge". In addition, the applicable porti,)n of the

statute concerns bail agent reimbursement for charges actually incurred and the statu1e simply
does not include expenses for recovering an abscondee. Two Jinn's collateral argument also
distorts the traditional and accepted meaning of that term.

4

The statute could easily state that recovery expenses were allowed to be reimbursed. It
does not. Two Jinn's arguments are better addressed to the Idaho Legislature. Howevn, at this
time, the statute simply fails to allow for this.
Accordingly, in view ofthe foregoing, the decision of the Department is hereby affirn1ed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED This ~~~ day of May, 2011.
I
f

~~t1.~G~

Kathryn S . klen
Senior Dis ict Judge

)"Aladdin requires that defendants enter the Indemnity Agreement, including its requirement that the defendant
reimburse Aladdin or its surety for any forfeiture, to secure the surety's undertaking pursuant to the bail bond
agreement and to protect against loss if the defendant breaches his obligation." Petitioner's Reply Brief, at 4.
"[p]roperty which is pledged as security for the satisfaction of a debt." BLACK'S LAW
4Collateral is "[p]roperty
Ed., at 237 (1979).
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I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have IT.ailed,
nailed, by
United States Mail, one copy of the above MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice
pursuant to Rule 77(d) LR.C.P. to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:
JOHN C. KEENAN
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720
SCOTT MCKAY
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
PO BOX 2772
BOISE, ID 83701

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, I

Date:
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Scott McKay (ISB#4309)
(lSB#4309)
Robyn Fyffe (ISB#7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise,ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274
smckay(fv,nbmlaw.com
rfYffe(ai,nbmlaw.com
rf"ffe(ai,nbmlaw.com

" ( 2"DII
2'D/1

::: ~; ~~~:;~.
~f~~:;~. G~l\:k
G~I\:k
·~.i.:i~l'·
·~.i.:i~l'·
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,linn, Inc.
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant Two .linn,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of:
TWO .lINN, INC.'s
Request for
ror Declaratory Ruling
Regarding Idaho Code § 41-1042

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2010-17486

NOTICE OF APPEAL

._----)
)
TWO JINN, INC, a CalitDrnia corporation )
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and )
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and )
Anytime Bail Bonds;
)
)
Petitioner/ Appellant,
Petitioner/Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF n\JSURANCE,)
)
Respondent.
)
---_._------~

1·

-----

----~

NOTICE OF APPEAL

\G\
OR \G\
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT IDAHO
IDAIIO DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY MR.
MR . .fOHN C. KEENAN, DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 700 WEST STATE
STREET, P.O. BOX 83720, BOISE, ID 83720-0043 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant, Two linn, Inc. ("Two .linn"),
linn"), appeals against the

above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the "Memorandum Decision and
Order Rc: Petition Seeking ludicial Review:'
Review:" which was entered in the above entitled action

OIl

the 3 rd day of May, 2011, the Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, presiding.
2.

Two .finn has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order

described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (f) of the
Idaho Appellate Rules ("LA.R.").
3.

A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which Two .finn presently intends

to assert is:
Is the Idaho Department ofInsurance's declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 preclude:;
linn from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction which
Two .linn

permits collection of apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to appear
as required in court unreasonable and does it prejudice Two linn's substantial rights?
Two .finn may assert other issues on appeal as permitted by Rule.
4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

a.

The reporter's transcript is requested.

b.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format:

2·
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6.

(1)

Argument on Motion to Stay held October 4,2010;

(2)

Oral argument held February 16,2011.
16, 201 I.

The appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
a.

Motiion to Stay Final Agency Order filed September 3, 2010;

b.

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Stay filed September 3, 2010;

c.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay filed September 3,2010;

d.

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Final Agency Order filed
September 16, 2010;

e.

Order Governing Judicial Review filed September 20,20 10;

f.

Amended Notice of Lodging Agency Record and Transcripts filed
Sept,ember
Sept1ember 24, 2010;

g.

Certiificate of Agency Record filed September 29,2010;

h.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Stay filed
September 30, 2010;

i.

Orde:r Granting Petitioner's Motion to Stay Final Agency Order filed

October 4, 2010;

7.

J.

I 0;
Petitioner's Opening Brief filed December 2, 20
2010;

k.

Respondent's Brief filed December 30, 2010;

I.J.

Petitioner's Reply Brief filed January 20, 2011.

I certifY:
a.

3·

That no court reporter is identified on the Register of Actions for this

ca~ e
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as being present during the proceedings in which a transcript has been
requested and therefore this notice of appeal has not been served on a
reporter.
b.

fo),
That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the estimated fee fo)'
preparation of the reporter's transcript because no estimate is currently
available. The estimated fee will be paid as soon as the estimate is
provided.

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Idaho
(1).
Code Section 67-1401 (I).

rz.rz.
DATED this 1- day of June, 2011.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

~~

Scott McKay
Attorneys for Appellant Two Jinn, Inc.

4·
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on June
document to be:

1-, 2011,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

)( mailed
hand delivered
faxed
to
Mr. John C. Keenan
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Insurance
700 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0043

~~/
~
~/
Scott McKay
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the above-referenced appeal with the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,

Supreme Court Case No. 38759
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial Districl of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:

That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.
EXHIBIT~;
EXHIBIT~;

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as
the Record:

to

1. Agency's Record On Petition For Judicial Review.
2. Transcript of Hearing Before the Director Of The Department OfInsurance, Held
March 8, 2010.
3. Transcript of Hearing Before the Director Of The Department Of Insurance, Held

July 21,2010.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the sad
Court this 27th day of July, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

( \t
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,

Supreme Court Case No. 38759
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Respondent.

I, CHIUSTOPHER D. IUCH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCIUPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

SCOTT MCKAY

JOHN C. KEENAN

TTOR1\TEY FOR APPELLANT
A
ATTOR1\TEY

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDEi\ T

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

CHIUSTOPHER D. IUCH
Clerk of the District Court

JUL 2 7 2011
Date of Service: ------------------------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds,

Supreme Court Case No. 38759
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Petition~:r -Appellant,
Petition~:r

vs.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certifY that the above and

foregoin.~
foregoin.~

record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a tm~
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rulles, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on th~
7th day of June, 2011.

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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